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This thesis addresses the question of the role of everyday places in the 
constitution of the contemporary urban lifeworld. The focus of the 
examination is on the aesthetics of places – understood primarily as the 
experiential quality and character of places – and on the interconnections 
between the abstract experiential dimensions and more concrete functional 
and material dimensions inherent in the mundane places of our urban life. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis comes primarily from 
philosophical aesthetics, particularly from everyday aesthetics, and it is 
complemented by insights from the postphenomenological philosophy of 
technology and ecological environmental psychology. Certain ideas 
originating in human geography, planning theory, architectural theory and the 
theory of design are also applied. On this basis, the thesis introduces a 
postphenomenologically-oriented affordance-based framework for 
understanding the aesthetics of everyday urban places. 
The thesis builds on a Heideggerian place-based ontology that 
acknowledges “placedness” as the general condition for human experience and 
existence. According to the Heideggerian line of thought, there is an 
ontological difference between places as ontic phenomena and places as 
ontological structures, referring to the difference between places encountered 
within the lifeworld and places as constitutive of the lifeworld. As ontological 
structures, places cannot in principle be encountered and thus thematized as 
objects of conscious experience. This distinction is not acknowledged 
adequately enough in common accounts of place, including certain forms of 
place-based urban planning and urban development, such as various design-
led place-making policies and practices. 
The thesis presents an alternative, affordance-based account of places and 
their experiential qualities that is helpful in understanding the speculativeness 
of the place-making project that operates at the level of “generalized subject” 
and “generalized place experiences,” thus ignoring the necessary 
idiosyncrasies inherent in every possible experiencing agent. According to the 
main argument, there are certain commonly recognized features in urban 
everyday places that make them “known” for many people from different 
backgrounds and with different experiential histories. Using the affordance-
based terminology, such features comprise the canonical affordances of the 
places: they are the possibilities for use and action that first come into one’s 
mind when thinking of a well-known place in one’s home town. 
Canonical affordances are normative in that they can be perceived and 
utilized either correctly or incorrectly, and they manifest the “normal way” of 
relating to the affordances present in an environment. The canonical 
affordances inherent in our daily environments largely define the contents of 
our everyday life, as well as our understanding of our everyday life. However, 
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normativity also prevails with regard to more nuanced and intricate place-
based affordances, giving rise to the conventionalization of more personal and 
reference group-specific relations to a place and its experiential character. 
Thus the experiential character of an everyday place is, at least partially, the 
outcome of the processes of familiarization and canonization. 
Such an outlook on the aesthetics of everyday places highlights the role that 
certain lesser-known and unrecognized experiential dimensions of mundane 
places may have in the constitution of the contemporary urban lifeworld. The 
central outcome of the thesis is that the idiosyncratic and often not-so-obvious 
experiential qualities inherent in the most familiar environments and places 
are crucial when looked at from the viewpoint of comprehensive well-being, 
thus forming a subject that requires more attention when trying to enhance 





Writing this thesis has been an interesting and inspiring but also challenging 
and at times even frustrating project that has included many phases. The thesis 
covers a variety of diverse but still essentially related themes. Bouncing back 
and forth between topics such as the theory of urban planning, philosophy of 
technology, design-led place-making practices and technologically aided ways 
of moving around (to name a few) eventually forms a complex and manifold 
ensemble that constitutes the substantive core of this thesis.  
To be honest, it has not always been entirely clear even to the author 
himself how closely the sub-parts of this project are connected. However, from 
a retrospective perspective it is easy to see that the covered topics are deeply 
intertwined, and that they are all essential parts of a larger phenomenon that 
can be called the everyday urban experience. One could say that there has 
been some kind of guiding intuition about the relevance of the thesis that has 
helped in carrying through the diverse phases of the project. It also seems that 
the initial intuition has not been altogether mistaken, even though some 
doubts and uncertainties may have occurred at times. 
Having said that, now it is time to thank those people and organizations 
that have contributed to the process and the outcome of the Ph.D. project 
during this memorable journey. First, I wish to thank my supervisors, 
Professor of Aesthetics at the University of Helsinki, Arto Haapala, and 
Professor of Strategic Urban Planning at Aalto University, Raine Mäntysalo. 
As the main supervisor of my work, Arto has been my primary guide in the 
academic world, and concerning the everyday dealings and bureaucracies 
related to academic work at the university. Over the years, he has provided me 
with numerous practical and theoretical insights, and I am very grateful. Arto 
has given me the space that a personal research project requires, but he has 
been there to tackle any challenges whenever needed. 
As my secondary supervisor, Raine has primarily served as a “sparrer,” who 
has relentlessly, but in a justifiable manner, challenged certain 
presuppositions and established conceptions that academic philosophers may 
at times take for granted. Such a critical and questioning attitude has forced 
me to double-check and re-evaluate my theoretical basis, as well as certain 
methodological and strategic choices on many occasions, so that the ultimate 
outcome would be based on as solid ground as possible. 
I am also grateful to my pre-examiners, University Professor at George 
Mason University and Distinguished Senior Fellow in the Global Climate 
Program, Andrew Light, and University Lecturer at Tampere University, Dr. 
Pekka Passinmäki. They have provided me with valuable comments and 
suggestions that were helpful in the final phase of the work. Despite the critical 
stance that is absolutely necessary for a pre-examiner, the comprehensive and 
detailed reviews were admirably constructive and very encouraging, ultimately 
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indicating that the thesis not only includes the necessary academic merits but 
also serves as a relevant starting point for further inquiries and academic 
research. 
I wish to express my special gratitude to Hanna Mattila, whose seminal 
work from the early 2000s originally introduced me to the field of applied 
urban aesthetics, or to the aesthetics of urban planning, to be more exact. 
Having finished my master’s thesis about six years ago on a topic closely 
related to Hanna’s previous work, I had the pleasure of working in the same 
research group with her for a while. Her inspiring example has encouraged me 
to go further and push harder, even though at times it may have seemed that 
very few people really understand exactly what we are doing and why. 
I am indebted to Sanna Lehtinen for our fruitful collaboration over the 
years. The conferences and events we both attended, as well as our co-
authored articles, form a remarkable part of my Ph.D. project – regarding both 
the progress of the thesis, and the meaningfulness of my academic everyday. 
The meetings we have had before an upcoming event or deadline have been 
more than welcome, bringing a certain structure and a crucial social 
dimension to the thesis writer’s everyday that typically consists of countless 
hours of solitary labor amidst books, piles of paper and a steadily humming 
computer. Over the years, her personal insights concerning both academic and 
more “real-life” issues – as well as concerning the challenging task of 
combining academic and other spheres of life – have served as an 
indispensable source of strategic wisdom, practical information and solace to 
me. 
I am thankful to a number or colleagues and peers at my current academic 
home, the University of Helsinki. I have shared many memorable moments 
with them, either in various conferences, in the Doctoral Programme working 
seminars, in the university cafeterias, or in the often so deserted corridors of 
the Topelia Building. These people include: Raine Aiava, Hanne Appelqvist, 
Ana Calvete, Martta Heikkilä, Onerva Kiianlinna, Noora-Helena Korpelainen, 
Johannes Koskela, Oiva Kuisma, Saara Moisio, Harri Mäcklin, Henrik 
Pathirane, Kimmo Sarje and Janne Vanhanen. 
I also wish to thank many people at my second academic home, Aalto 
University. This is where I initially started my academic career (though it was 
called the Helsinki University of Technology or TKK back then), and where I 
have returned on a rather regular basis – either as a student, as a course 
assistant, as a researcher or as a guest lecturer. So I would like to thank Oya 
Duman, Aino Hirvelä, Mervi Ilmonen, Marketta Kyttä, Tiina Laatikainen, 
Milos Mladenovic and Matti Tainio. 
This thesis project has involved collaboration with several international 
contacts and organizations, too. I am extremely grateful for all the jointly 
organized events and their associated publications, as well as for the 
conferences and seminars that I have had the privilege to take part in as a 
presenter. First of all, thanks go to the Philosophy of the City Research Group 
in its entirety, but particularly to Michael Nagenborg, Jules Simon and Shane 
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Epting. It has been a pleasure to work with them over the years – not least 
because a majority of my original publications result from the collaboration 
with them in one way or another. 
I also wish to thank my Gniezno and Warsaw-based Polish colleagues, 
Beata Frydryczak, Mateusz Salwa, Adam Andrzejewski, Łukasz Posłuszny, 
Monika Stobiecka and Piotr Szczepański. Their generous hospitality during 
our joint seminar in Poland a few years ago really impressed me, and the 
subsequent collaboration has been both productive and delightful, providing 
me ultimately with an original publication. 
I am thankful to those people who had the main responsibility for 
organizing a memorable conference in Eindhoven – that is, Sergio M. 
Figueiredo, Sukanya Krishnamurthy and Torsten Schroeder. I have warm 
memories of participating in the event in a dual role of acting as a session host 
and also as a presenter. One outcome of the conference is the publication of a 
book, which includes one of original research publications that also forms part 
of my thesis.  
In addition to this, I wish to thank certain architects at the University of 
Oulu – namely Aulikki Herneoja, Sari Hirvonen-Kantola and Aale Luusua –
not only for hosting an interesting and enjoyable event, but also for the fruitful 
discussions during the coffee breaks, and the insights I gained afterwards 
when familiarizing myself with their previous work. This particular event was 
of special importance to me, since it was organized in the city where I was born 
and where I spend my entire childhood, thus giving me an extraordinary 
experience of being a visitor or even an “outsider” in my old home town.  
There is a collection of people with whom I have spent time in numerous 
conferences and seminars, or with whom I have interacted due to publication 
processes. It is not possible to list all these people here, but I definitely want 
express my gratitude to Curtis Carter, Knut-Ove Eliassen, Jonathan Maskit, 
Yuriko Saito and Brit Strandhagen. 
The City of Lahti has had a special role in my thesis project, partly since the 
International Institute of Applied Aesthetics is based there. Several 
conferences, seminars and workshops that were organized in Lahti have 
played an important part in advancing my thesis. Additionally, it has been 
truly fascinating to follow closely how Lahti has actively and determinedly 
created its own innovative path, eventually gaining a status as a recognized 
pioneer in land use planning and more general environmental matters. 
Therefore I wish to thank the (then) representatives of the city, particularly 
Johanna Palomäki and Saara Vauramo, and the people from the Lahti 
University Campus, especially Senja Jouttimäki and Anja Kuhalampi. 
I also wish to thank my former colleagues and particularly my former 
superiors and instructors in my previous place of employment, Finnish 
Environment Institute, for giving me the confidence that is absolutely 
necessary in a project as lengthy and challenging as writing a Ph.D. thesis. 
These people are: Niko Karvosenoja, Kaarle Kupiainen, Ville Helminen and 
Mika Ristimäki. 
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the Doctoral Student Services at the Faculty of Arts, particularly Jutta 
Kajander, for taking care of many practical issues related to finishing this 
thesis project. I have been lucky enough to write it while occupying the 
position of a salaried doctoral candidate; I am therefore extremely thankful to 
the University of Helsinki for providing me with the material and social 
environment for my Ph.D. project. 
I am grateful to my mother-in-law Arja Kannisto, who has so often taken 
care of my daughter and thus enabled me to advance my thesis in many critical 
phases. Without your priceless help, this thesis might not be as complete as it 
is now, or at least there would have been many more regrettable and stressful 
delays during the journey. 
I wish to thank my brother, architect Pyry Vihanninjoki, for many inspiring 
and informative discussions about architecture, the built environment and the 
role of aesthetics in society more generally. He has often served as my primary 
connection to the sometimes harsh realities that prevail in the world of 
construction and planning, and his personal views and insights have often 
been very valuable from my research point of view. I even suppose it was he 
who originally introduced me to some classics of existential philosophy –
Camus and Sartre, if I recall correctly – which may eventually have had certain 
“fatal” consequences considering my later career choices. 
I am very thankful to my parents, Eija Vihanninjoki and Kyösti 
Vihanninjoki, for your support and patience throughout. My academic career 
thus far – including the numerous changes of direction – may have looked 
quite complicated and even somewhat chaotic at times. However, without your 
liberal and permissive attitude I most probably would not have ended up 
writing a thesis about such a multidisciplinary topic, combining insights from 
many different academic fields that already were somewhat familiar to me 
from previous encounters with them. Fostering curiosity and believing in 
oneself (according to your advice) has led this far, now it is time to see what 
the future holds for me. 
Finally, I thank my loving family, Jenni and Tove. You make my everyday 
meaningful, and you give me a reason to try even harder. I wish to be as good 
a spouse and a father to you as possible, despite my sometimes silly and 
eccentric academic interests. Becoming a father while writing the thesis has 
remarkably widened my perspective, and also brought certain abstract 
philosophical ideas about human existence more alive. Above all, the 
unavoidable limitations of a single human life do not feel that oppressive 
anymore, as I have you, Tove. I dedicate this work to you. 
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This thesis addresses the question of the role of everyday places in the 
constitution of the contemporary urban lifeworld. The focus of the 
examination is on the aesthetics of places – understood primarily as the 
experiential quality and character of places – and on the interconnections 
between the abstract experiential dimensions and more concrete functional 
and material dimensions inherent in the mundane places of our urban life. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis comes primarily from 
philosophical aesthetics, particularly from everyday aesthetics, and it is 
complemented by insights from the postphenomenological philosophy of 
technology and ecological environmental psychology. Also certain ideas 
originating in human geography, planning theory, architectural theory and the 
theory of design are applied. 
This introduction to the thesis comprises seven chapters. The first chapter 
discusses the general features of place as a phenomenon and introduces the 
framework of everyday aesthetics. The second chapter examines the functions 
of the built environment and the connections between functionality and 
familiarity of human environments in more detail. After this, I will introduce 
the concept of the lifeworld: the focus is on the different horizons of the 
lifeworld, and on the relationship between the lifeworld and the everyday. I 
also address the role of places as the fundamental socio-material platform for 
the lifeworld. 
The following chapter moves on to the theme of contextuality, scrutinizing 
the immaterial functions of an urban environment and the meaning of familiar 
things as the essential sources of contextuality that is characteristic of the 
lifeworld. Familiarization involves all the horizons of the lifeworld, which 
entails essential connections between the dimensions of sensory perception, 
functionality and cultural interpretation. All these dimensions have a role in 
our relationship to familiar things that, for their part, define how we interpret 
our environments. Further insights into the theme of “seeing through things” 
are gained from the postphenomenological philosophy of technology in the 
next chapter.  
The mediating role of technological and other artifacts in our relationship 
to the world is an essential part of postphenomenological thinking, 
acknowledging the related contingencies and path-dependencies that stem 
from the historical nature of all functional items. Addressing the different 
modes of presence of various technologies in more detail is helpful in 
understanding the structure of our lifeworld, particularly concerning the 
taken-for-granted nature of our most familiar functional entities. 
In order to emphasize matters of interpretative perception, the penultimate 
chapter introduces the notion of “affordance,” implying that the possible uses 
and actions that an entity may afford take place in a specific context and exist 
Introduction 
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for a particular experiencing agent. The perspective of ecological 
environmental psychology entails the idea that the affordance-based 
evaluation of different environments has its counterpart in the quality of 
perception, so that the most suitable environments tend to be preferred 
aesthetically. 
The concluding chapter summarizes the main observations based on the 
various theoretical frameworks, showing that these diverse positions jointly 
provide a novel and seminal perspective on everyday urban environments and 
the places they consist of. Such an outlook on the aesthetics of everyday places 
highlights the role that certain lesser-known and unrecognized experiential 
dimensions of mundane places may have in the constitution of the 
contemporary urban lifeworld. The central outcome of the thesis is that the 
idiosyncratic and often not-so-obvious experiential qualities inherent in the 
most familiar environments and places are crucial from the viewpoint of 
comprehensive well-being, thus forming a subject that requires more attention 





2 PLACE AS A PHENOMENON AND THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF EVERYDAY 
AESTHETICS 
“Place” is a central concept in many disciplines. Recently, it has been 
addressed from the viewpoint of architecture, planning theory, economics, 
social sciences, human geography, environmental psychology and philosophy, 
to name a few. Hence, it seems that despite the increased mobility of people 
and commodities, and the rapid development of information technology that 
allows various forms of “distant presence,” the significance of stationary and 
relatively stable places has not altogether vanished. On the contrary, one could 
even speak of a small-scale renaissance of place-related research, and the 
number of recent research articles from different fields of study is already vast. 
This also pertains to urban studies and urbanism, where place and its relation 
to urbanity has been a salient subject of interest lately. 
Despite the apparent topicality of the notion of place, it is not entirely clear 
whether the concept refers to a single well-defined phenomenon, or whether 
instead it catches a complex ensemble, consisting of multiple intersecting and 
overlapping phenomena. Place and its meaning can be, and have been, 
conceived in many different ways, according to the emphases and the 
conventions of the discipline in question. For example, one can approach place 
as a design problem (questions related to scale, form-giving and other details), 
place as a part of urban structure (questions of functionality, location and 
connections), place as a site of productivity (questions of attractiveness, 
creativity and monetary value), place as a manifestation of social order 
(questions of social justice and injustice, of inclusion and exclusion), place as 
home (questions of belonging and identity), place as a source of individual 
well-being (questions of health and happiness), and place as a way of being 
(questions of existence and experience). The variety of different angles is, 
indeed, so great that one has serious challenges in trying grasp what exactly is 
essential in the phenomenon of place. 
The situation is similar with space: one can either examine different 
possible spaces (such as urban space, architectural space, social space or 
symbolic space) and their characteristic features, or one can focus on the 
phenomenon of spatiality itself (see e.g. Malpas 2012b). Also, just as spatiality 
is a basic condition for human existence and experience, so we can see that the 
same applies to place: while we are necessarily surrounded by space that for 
its part defines our current state of existence, we are always in a place that 
constitutes a firm ground for our being. In a very fundamental sense, spatiality 
presupposes places – space consists of the relations between places – and 
there is no real opposition between these two. The evident problem with space, 
and its counterpart place, is that they are such abstract phenomena: it is very 
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hard to say anything meaningful about spatiality itself without making 
references to examples of more concrete spatial phenomena (that hereby 
inhabit places, too). 
We are thus forced to examine concrete places in order to gain some 
understanding of the general condition of one’s existence as a “placed being”: 
it is merely via particular case studies that we can access the more primordial 
meaning of places. A note of caution is, however, required since we easily go 
astray in getting involved in the idiosyncrasies of a particularly fascinating 
place too deeply, thus losing sight of the significance of more mundane, even 
banal places. It is undeniably tempting to analyze the rich details and the vivid 
history of, say, an ancient piazza, a medieval fountain, or a 19th-century 
monumental square, but these kinds of extraordinary urban places reveal very 
little about the structure and the realities of our present-day urban life. On the 
contrary, it is precisely the unobtrusive, trivial and sometimes quite 
uninteresting places that are of crucial importance to our daily well-being and 
to the quality of our everyday lives. 
The fundamental role of such ordinary urban places is also a central 
question in the field of everyday aesthetics, a sub-discipline of philosophical 
aesthetics which focuses on experiential values and meanings that 
traditionally have not been considered as purely or properly “aesthetic.” To be 
sure, there has been considerable debate within the discourse on everyday 
aesthetics, concerning the definition of the term “everyday” and thus the 
eventual aims of the field (see e.g. Highmore 2011; Leddy 2012, 2015; 
Melchionne 2013, 2014; Naukkarinen 2013, 2017; Saito 2007, 2017). Some 
claim that everyday aesthetics is, or ought to be, about expanding the scope of 
aesthetics to such aesthetically relevant phenomena that – mainly due to 
historical reasons – have not been adequately addressed before; others think 
that what is, or ought to be, central is a certain mode of experience and being 
that is characteristic of our everyday. The latter stance thus focuses specifically 
on the “everydayness” of our everyday lives, insisting that there exists an 
entirely different type or subspecies of aesthetic phenomena that we lose sight 
of if we merely broaden the range of aesthetics outside the traditional subjects 
(i.e. art and nature)1.  
To be more exact, the representatives of the latter stance claim that 
“everydayness” refers to specific types of relations to things that we encounter 
on a daily basis – to relations that, according to Ossi Naukkarinen (2013, sec. 
                                                 
1 Art (including high-end architecture) and nature, without doubt, comprise an indispensable part of our 
everyday urban surroundings, particularly judging from the aesthetic point of view. Hence they cannot 
be left without attention when addressing cities and our experiential relation to them as a whole. The 
aesthetic relevance of art and nature is, to be honest, so obvious that many other aesthetically relevant 
phenomena have been by and large neglected until recently. This is why the thesis at hand deliberately 
focuses almost solely on aspects of urban environments other than art and nature, emphasizing the 




2), are “colored with routines, familiarity, continuity, normalcy, habits, the 
slow process of acclimatization, even superficiality and a sort of half-
consciousness and not with creative experiments, exceptions, constant 
questioning and change, analyses, and deep reflections.” On the basis of this 
view, in a commentary on the recent debate, Kalle Puolakka (2018, sec. 1, 
emphasis added) describes the relationary view as follows: “The everyday is 
not constituted by a group of objects, events, and activities but rather by a 
specific kind of attitude we take toward the objects and events that surround 
us daily and the activities we perform regularly.”  
Naukkarinen (2013) also uses the term “attitude,” and he uses it somewhat 
carelessly, largely as an interchangeable alternative for the term “relation.” 
Despite this, “taking an attitude” does not have exactly the meaning as “having 
a relation,” at least in this particular case. Why this is so important is that the 
main argument in this kind of relational everyday aesthetics is that we do not 
actively choose the everyday relation to things, but that we eventually end up 
having such relations. This has to do with the processes of familiarization and 
getting used to, and they are also of utmost importance when thinking of our 
relationship to our habitat and other environments that we visit regularly. 
It is important to understand the role of choice correctly here: we may, 
more or less freely, choose our habitat, but we cannot freely choose our 
relationship to it. Whether we want it or not, in the course of time we get used 
to our habitat, be it of high or low quality, to our liking or not. Despite the fact 
that eventually we are attuned to our everyday surroundings and thus begin 
having essentially an everyday relation to it, the questions of quality and liking 
do, nevertheless, matter. A high-quality environment notably enhances our 
well-being2 (see e.g. Cooper, Burton & Cooper 2014), and the possibility to live 
                                                 
2 Defining “well-being” is a very challenging task, as it could well be the most disputed concept in the 
field of social sciences. Such ambiguity becomes a problem especially when trying to analyze those 
factors and mechanisms that generally either increase or decrease the amount of well-being, as there are 
no universal ways of measuring such changes. This is also an evident challenge in the field of such 
environmental studies that focus on the relationship between environment and well-being. For instance, 
in a review article discussing the connections between urban environmental quality and human well-
being, van Kamp et al. (2003, p. 16) end up stating that “neither a generally accepted framework, nor a 
coherent system to evaluate aspects of and trends in environmental quality in relation to well-being, has 
been developed.” In the same vein, in the summary of a reference guide on well-being and the 
environment, Cooper and Burton (2014, p. 664) point out that “one of the main issues is a lack of 
definition or consistency in the concept of wellbeing. This is an issue that extends beyond built-
environment research, but this field presents particular challenges.” Having said this, it is clear that 
finding an informative and inclusive but still univocal and brief enough definition for well-being falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. Hence we must settle for a more general-level tentative description of 
well-being, emphasizing experiential and thus “subjective” dimensions. An apt candidate for such a 
description is a formulation by the What Works Centre for Wellbeing (n.d.), which implies that our 
personal well-being comprises “how satisfied we are with our lives, our sense that what we do in life is 
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in one’s preferred area is an essential part of self-expression, and a basic 
constituent of a meaningful and satisfying life. The main problem here is that 
unfortunately we can, and relatively often we do, also get used to low-quality 
environments that do not properly fulfil our criteria for a decent habitat. 
To exaggerate slightly, one could even say that this is exactly the case in 
most contemporary cities that are planned and constructed in the era of 
passenger car – in cities that neglect the scale of human being, prioritizing the 
needs and desires of cars over those of people (see e.g. Newman & Kenworthy 
1989, 1999, 2015). The norm of the automobile-oriented city is still influential, 
and we do not even necessarily fully realize the apparent downsides before we 
experience an alternative living environment. While many urban 
environments are ill-fitting from the viewpoint of human well-being and 
flourishing, we have attuned to them, we take them for granted and thus try to 
manage our everyday lives in them, even though this does not reduce the 
detrimental effects that such environs have on us.3 
The fact that we end up having everyday-kind of relations to a plethora of 
things in our social and material environments also marks the starting point 
for everyday aesthetics as a positive and change-promoting enterprise: only 
by acknowledging the existence of everyday relations in the first place, can we 
address matters of everyday quality, and eventually try to effect a change. We 
cannot change something that we are not aware of or understand. This also 
enables the use and misuse of power. The built environment is, to be sure, 
replete with obvious manifestations and more intricate symbols of power and 
related ideologies, though we often do not see them as such, but view them 
more as a mere neutral background or framework for our everyday lives that 
is simply there (see Dovey 1999). However, these are central questions when 
trying to increase the social and cultural sustainability of architecture, urban 
design, urban planning and urban development more generally (see e.g. 
Robinson, Dale & Duschenko 2012; Williams, Burton & Jenks 2000).  
 
                                                 
worthwhile, our day-to-day emotional experiences (happiness and anxiety) and our wider mental 
wellbeing.” 
3 Despite this, it is quite burdensome trying to see the asphalt-coated parking lots and avenues, or the 
cast concrete ramps and overpasses of a car-oriented city in a truly positive light if one happens to be an 
advocate of more humane and small-scale urban environments. This tends to be so even with regard to 
certain details of the automobile environment, such as sculpture-like bridges or near-sublime multi-level 
intersections that could in isolation be seen as masterpieces of architecture and engineering science, 
even in the eyes of a “car-hostile” person. However, having experienced an environment that has been 
planned and constructed with an emphasis on human well-being, one may begin seeing the automobile 
city more clearly in a negative light – i.e. as unfit, unsatisfactory and ugly. For a more thorough account 
of such “negative aesthetics,” see e.g. Berleant (2010, 2011). 
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3 THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT AND ITS 
FUNCTIONS 
From the viewpoint of everyday aesthetics, the built environment is, indeed, 
of utmost importance with regards to the constitution of our “urban 
normalcy.” This is particularly due to the relatively stable and long-lasting 
nature of buildings and various other urban structures, and due to their 
tremendous yet subtle power to change, steer and limit the realities and 
possibilities of our lives. As a material entity, the lifespan of a building may 
well extend over centuries, even though the functions and uses that the 
building enables might vary considerably over time. Hence it is difficult to 
grasp the overall essence of an environment or a building merely by analyzing 
its functional dimension, for there is always a remarkable contingency 
involved in matters of function. Roger Scruton (1994, p. 43, emphasis added) 
has, for example, pointed out that functions may alter quite drastically, which 
undermines attempts to define the essence and the quality of a building on the 
basis of its functions: 
Of course, particular buildings have particular functions: but their 
ability to satisfy these functions, while it may explain their existence, 
does not describe their essence. Function may be the least important, 
and in any event the least permanent, feature of a building. What was 
once a factory becomes a museum or an apartment block; a church 
becomes an assembly hall, or a market; and so on. Buildings of the past 
– at least those that persuade us to preserve them – have lent 
themselves to functional transformations, and have developed under 
the influence of changes which were never foreseen by their architects. 
It is clear that Scruton is criticizing, above all, a certain modern 
functionalist conception that largely builds on the visions of the architect-
designer, emphasizing the meaning of pre-defined uses and the importance of 
knowledge-based anticipation more generally. Such modern “functional 
puritanism” does not apply merely to buildings but also to a variety of urban 
structures – such as streets, squares, etc. – and perhaps the most influential 
manifestations of modern functionalism have taken place at the level of spatial 
planning, resulting in a strict and inflexible functional categorization of the 
city. 
However, the ambiguity related to functions pertains even more to larger 
urban entities, such as neighborhoods and entire districts. The recent 
development of cities expanding to various brownfield sites, like former 
harbors, airports and other industrial areas, is a tremendous example of this. 
Even in the field of spatial planning, where the pivotal ideas of functionalism 
have largely been integrated into legislation and thus have enormous influence 
over the development of cities, the realities of urbanism have proven the 
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functionalist doctrine to be far too idealistic. The tendency of modernist 
architecture and urban planning to conceive the notion of function in an overly 
narrow sense seems to be the stumbling block of modern thinking: if one 
emphasizes too much a single predefined function of a building or an urban 
environment, one simply fails to acknowledge the essence of cities as 
constantly and continuously evolving and ever-renewing entities.  
Dismissing the varieties of functions is characteristic of, but does not 
pertain merely to, the modernist line of thought. Even though the diversity and 
certain open-endedness of functions in urban environments is acknowledged 
nowadays, the notion of function is still often understood from a traditional 
and reductive perspective. While primarily addressing the shortcomings of 
modernism, Scruton (1994, p. 43, original emphasis) makes observations that 
are relevant even today, pointing out certain relatively common difficulties 
that are related to dealing with matters of aesthetics and the experiential 
quality of an environment:  
A building must have a use: the problem is in specifying the use. The 
use of a building is always something which the building itself creates. 
The use is therefore so little separable from the context which the 
building provides, that it cannot serve as a criterion whereby to 
distinguish the essential from the accidental. There has been a tendency 
in modern “design theory” to regard function as the premise of design, 
aesthetic quality as its consequence. In truth it is function which is 
consequential; aesthetic quality is the major premise from which 
function derives. 
Here we have at least three different yet interconnected arguments that 
deserve closer examination. First, there simply does not exist the function of a 
building, but perhaps a function that currently happens to take place in the 
building (or, which is more likely, a selection of possible functions depending 
on the perspective from which we approach the building). Secondly, the 
potential use(s) of a building essentially depend on the kind of context that the 
building gives rise to. Thirdly, the aesthetic quality of the building has a crucial 
role in defining the uses that it enables. 
What is particularly interesting here is that Scruton points out the crucial 
yet not-so-evident connections between use and context on one hand, and 
between use and aesthetics on the other. Accordingly, there is no sense in 
addressing the questions of use without paying attention to the context in 
which the potential uses are about to take place: it is the context that defines 
the possible, appropriate and desired uses. There are, to be sure, contexts of 
many different levels, from concrete material surroundings to more abstract 
entireties of established practices and the culture-specific ways of living and 
valuation. As Scruton states, a single building has the capacity to provide a 
context for action and use – mainly at the level of material framework, but 
nevertheless complying with the pragmatic conventions and eventually 
manifesting the prevailing values of the culture. 
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The aesthetic quality of a building, in turn, can be seen to have a 
considerable influence on what kind of context it eventually provides. Here the 
aesthetic quality does not mean primarily matters of style, decoration and 
visual pleasure, but it has be seen as referring to the more general processes of 
sensing and interpretation. For Scruton, “aesthetics” has to do with the 
intermingling of sensory data and the cultural interpretations we constantly 
make, in that the apparently straightforward appearances of things are always 
full of subtle meanings to us: “We see things: but we also see the meaning of 
things; and the meaning saturates the appearance” (Scruton 1994, p. xvi, 
emphasis added). Hence the aesthetic quality of a building can have a decisive 
role in interpreting the building from the perspective of potential uses. 
Aesthetics is about how all the possible uses of a building become conceivable 
to us, and it also is about which of those plentiful uses appear as most suitable 
and preferable. 
The connections between uses, contexts and the aesthetic quality of the 
built environment are crucial from the viewpoint of everyday aesthetics and 
the constitution of our urban normalcy. In the course of our everyday life, we 
do not pay any specific attention to the particular uses that familiar buildings 
in our familiar surroundings provide: we are simply too attuned to them to be 
able to examine critically their existing and established uses, or to invent any 
radically new ones. We thus have a special relationship to such buildings and 
their surroundings as contexts, for they are the particular contexts that, by and 
large, define the content our everyday and thereby remarkably influence our 
way of life and even our identity (see Haapala 2003, 2005). 
We also have a special relationship to the aesthetic quality of familiar 
buildings and their vicinities: we are so used to the appearance of our 
neighborhood that questions related to its appearance even become trivial. 
Typically, we have a sort of half-conscious relationship to our nearest-and-
dearest environments, and it might be surprisingly difficult to describe their 
essential features to a stranger – at least when compared to depicting the 
vistas, soundscapes, smells and the overall character of a destination one has 
just arrived from.4 In such cases there is a notable correspondence between 
the environment and the experiencing agent, as they have a shared history. 
The apparent correspondence even reaches the level of bodily gestures in that 
one knows the details of the environment by motor coordination, thus 
enabling us to act smoothly and effortlessly. 
The ideal case of such familiar environments is home (Haapala 2005, 
Lehtinen 2015). Thinking of the aesthetic quality of home environments, 
familiarity with various things tends to give rise to certain feelings of coziness, 
ease and security. One could say that homes – or other home-like 
                                                 
4 This is a central topic in the discussion concerning the differences between a visitor’s and a local’s 
perspective on an environment (see e.g. Haapala 1998; Relph 1976; Tuan 1974, 1977). The specific 
attentiveness to the various details of a strange and unforeseen environment has been addressed under 
the rubric “tourist gaze” (see Urry 1990). 
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environments, such as hotels5, for that matter – generally represent a specific 
kind of aesthetics that is characteristic of reliable and unsurprising 
surroundings. What is particularly interesting and noteworthy in the case of 
such “homely aesthetics” is the kind of relationship that we have to the various 
items and devices that for their part comprise the functionality of the 
surroundings.  
At home we usually know very precisely the whereabouts of our everyday 
utensils, and the spatial arrangement is such that we do not have to pay much 
conscious attention to our daily chores.6 At home in one’s kitchen, one does 
not have to make many gestures to brew a cup of coffee. However, the setting 
changes remarkably if, say, there is no ground coffee left or someone has 
cleaned the coffee maker and put the parts to dry in a strange place. In such a 
situation one is required to stop the normal course of one’s actions and reflect 
on the steps one is about to take.7  
                                                 
5 The arrangement of things and the choice of materials is – particularly in the publicly accessible 
commercial homely environments (i.e. hotels) of the Western world – astonishingly universal and 
homogeneous, and one really has to make an effort to find an accommodation that daringly breaks the 
prevailing norm of “homely aesthetics.” Hotel rooms generally tend to be arranged in such a way that we 
are familiar with them even when we have not been there before. The variations between different hotels 
in different countries are more or less marginal, so that we spot and recognize the central items of the 
hotel room at a glance: there is the bed, there is the TV, and there is the minibar that provides one with 
a welcome refreshment at the “moment of despair” in a strange city in a foreign country. 
6 It must be acknowledged that the idealized descriptions of home as the most familiar environment 
provide us with an imaginary archetype that may not have a real-world equivalent, or that has at least a 
limited scope of application as such. For example, anyone who has shared their home with other 
inhabitants – be they fellow humans or non-human animals – knows that things are not always exactly 
where one has left them, and sometimes one’s home may begin to remind one of chaos, even if one tries 
to maintain a desired order. In addition to such relatively harmless occasions that have to do with sharing 
the home space with friendly cohabitants, there are more serious circumstances, in which the ideal of 
home remains a distant goal. Homelessness and oppressive domestic relationships, for instance, are 
regrettable phenomena, but their existence does not altogether undermine the general significance of 
home and the related aesthetics of the familiar. Indeed, the archetype of home may still prove to be very 
useful in that it helps us understand the salient idiosyncrasies of our relationship to the most familiar 
environments – that is, in comparison to environments that we visit more rarely or merely occasionally 
– thus revealing the existence of a significant phenomenon that would otherwise remain neglected. 
7 This is a classic example of the breakdown of an equipmental relation, bringing forth the normally 
hidden in-order-to structures of an equipmental entirety. According to Heidegger’s well-known analysis 
of equipmentality presented in Being and Time (published originally in 1927, see Heidegger 1978, 
particularly pp. 97–100; see also Heidegger 1982, pp. 292–293), single pieces of equipment – i.e. 
separate tools – exist merely in relation to other pieces of equipment, and to the equipmental whole (the 
coffee maker essentially belongs together with ground coffee, filter papers, coffee mugs and fresh water 
that, for their part, comprise the equipmental whole of a kitchen). To be more exact, they exist as pieces 
of equipment – i.e. as tools – and not as proper material objects due to their referential and “directed” 
nature: every piece of equipment involves a directed reference to other relevant pieces of equipment and 
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The coffee maker and the related items then become visible and tangible to 
us in a very different manner. We may even have to remind ourselves of the 
color and the form of the missing parts in order to create a mental image so 
that we can start feverishly searching the shelves and cabinets in our kitchen 
for them. Normally, when the coffee maker and its parts sit in their designated 
place, they are almost invisible, remaining in the background of our daily 
activities. It is this difference in the mode of presence that is of crucial 
importance here: the coffee maker is present to us in both cases, but merely in 
a differing way.8  
The fact that the coffee maker is still somehow present to us even when we 
do not pay any specific conscious attention to it reveals an important aspect 
about our environmental relationship and our way of existence in general. As 
worldly beings, we are always thrown in different situations with varying 
physical and social realities that give rise to more abstract cultural meanings. 
Being necessarily in the midst of things, plants, animals and other human 
beings, while trying to cope with them in struggling towards our objectives, is 
simply what constitutes the human condition. No philosophical speculation or 
thought experiment can alter this fundamental condition.  
Regardless of the plentiful things around us, we are capable of focusing on 
a relatively small number of things simultaneously, so that many aspects of the 
surrounding reality must remain “aside.” While there is a certain regularity in 
what comes to the fore and what forms the background of an experience in the 
course of our everyday – just think of the coffee maker oscillating between 
being visible and invisible – certain dimensions of our lives persistently tend 
to escape any attempts at reductive objectification. In order to understand the 
operations of our conscious experience and the underlying mechanisms more 
thoroughly, let us introduce the concept of “lifeworld.” 
 
                                                 
eventually to the outcomes that the use of equipment enables (coffee maker and the associated items 
afford us the moment of break and refreshment amidst a busy day filled with tasks that supposedly help 
us achieve our goals and advance our existential projects). Equipment is thus essentially something that 
we use in-order-to do or gain something else. Under normal circumstances, they withdraw into their 
usefulness and do not require any attention, and only when something goes wrong, do we encounter 
them as objects in their materiality. 
8 In Heideggerian terminology, when the coffee maker is present as a withdrawing tool, it is “ready-to-
hand” (zuhanden), and when it is present as an observable object, it is “present-at-hand” (vorhanden) 
(see Heidegger 1978). 
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4 THE LIFEWORLD, EVERYDAY, AND THE 
ROLE OF PLACES 
“Lifeworld” (Lebenswelt) is a rather technical term introduced by Edmund 
Husserl in his later writings.9 Despite the central role played by the concept in 
various phenomenologically-oriented disciplines (including many branches of 
philosophy, such as everyday aesthetics and the philosophy of technology, and 
different empirical social sciences, such as anthropology and sociology), its 
exact content has remained rather ambiguous and remarkably context-
sensitive. This has to do with the general nature of the concept as referring to 
the sphere of “actual immediate experiences” (see Madsen 2002, p. 11), and 
with the fact that there is a plethora of varying understandings and definitions 
of “experience.”  
The concept of the lifeworld does not, however, refer merely or even 
primarily to any singular experiences or any particular collection of such 
experiences, but to the more general conditions that the occurrence of 
meaningful experiences presupposes. Experiences do not take place in a void, 
but in a socio-historically defined context that has many dimensions. Such 
contexts have horizon-like qualities in that they serve as an unobtrusive yet 
necessary background for the focus of our conscious experiences. If we try to 
grasp the conditions of our experiences in their entirety, we are trying to 
objectify or thematize the context of our experience, which is impossible 
precisely due to the horizon-like quality of the context. In accordance with the 
metaphor of a horizon, when we try reach the “edge” of such an experiential 
horizon, our current horizon moves along with us, and when we eventually 
reach the presumed “edge,” we already have a new horizon that redefines our 
field of view and the range of perceivable things. 
The entire lifeworld can, in turn, be said to consist of multiple overlapping 
and intersecting horizons that in compound comprise the context of our 
experience. Madsen (2002, p. 8) has specified three different horizons as the 
central aspects or structural dimensions of the lifeworld: 1) the perceptual 
horizon, the immediate material framework of life; 2) the practical horizon, 
the functional organization of the everyday understood as meaningful activity; 
and 3) the cultural horizon, the general framework of interpretation. It is 
important to note that the horizons can be separated only for the sake of 
analysis, and in our experience they form a homogeneous amalgam that 
cannot be divided into clear-cut components.  
On the basis of this, it is clear that the concepts of the “everyday” and the 
“lifeworld” are essentially connected, but they still have a different meaning, 
                                                 
9 Husserl elaborates the concept particularly in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, published originally in 1936. See e.g. Madsen (2002) for more details concerning the 
history of the notion. 
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at least in the field of everyday aesthetics. “Lifeworld” refers to the general 
structure of our experience as a system of horizons, whereas the “everyday” 
refers specifically to the contextuality of the relations to the everyday objects 
and events. The fact that everyday relations are normally “taken for granted” 
constitutes the essence of a lifeworld and its horizons as something that is 
“given”: routine everyday relations to familiar things eventually comprise the 
unquestioned and unthematized frame for our conscious inquiries and 
actions. 
What is most important here is that many everyday objects do occasionally 
demand our conscious attention, but not all of them, and not at the same time. 
Even some established routines can sometimes be thematized and thus lose 
their status as a genuine routine, but this still does not compromise the basic 
structure and the “givenness” of the lifeworld. As Madsen (2002, p. 8) writes: 
Everyday life is for immediate consideration a heterogeneous sequence 
of activities. Each of them, more or less, at the center of our attention at 
certain moments. Most of these activities are routine, and thus not 
thematic, but both routine, and what becomes thematic, take place in 
the frame of a broader context, the horizon. 
To be sure, the routines and the horizons are in such a close interaction that 
they are occasionally difficult to distinguish from each other: some of our 
routines are so deeply rooted that we have difficulties imagining our life 
without them, thus verging on the status of a horizon. Such foundational 
routines have primarily to do with the very basic issues of our lives such as 
housing, nourishment and movement. For instance, if we have to move from 
our home even temporarily, if we have to alter our diet significantly, or if we 
for some reason are not able to walk, we really are forced to think the course 
of our everyday anew. 
To summarize, “lifeworld” refers to the given context of our experience, and 
while certain profound aspects of our lifeworld (i.e. the deeply rooted routines) 
can occasionally be subjected to conscious scrutiny, we necessarily stay in the 
sphere of the lifeworld, as we cannot obtain a truly external point of view to 
the perceptual, practical and cultural horizons we inhabit. In other words, we 
always are more or less immersed in the everydayness of our daily lives, 
whereas the balance between the established routines and exceptions from the 
routines constantly varies.  
The “degree” of everydayness in our urban everyday has proven to be the 
source of considerable theoretical debate, and there have been disagreements 
both among the theorists of everyday aesthetics and between the proponents 
of different disciplines. According to Puolakka (2018, sec. 4), for example, the 
described relationary view of everyday aesthetics involves a close-to-obsessive 
and somewhat unjustified tendency to subsume every possible encounter of 
our daily lives under the rubric of “everydayness”:  
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Everydayness becomes almost a kind of blanket that, in time, encloses 
all aspects of our daily lives as a result of acclimatization and, in a way, 
swallows up the sense of extraordinariness and vitality that some 
everyday factors might have had at first. [...] There is no reason why the 
general experiential quality of our everyday lives could not be 
considerably more nuanced than [the relationary views] on the 
everydayness of the everyday arguably leave room for. 
Without going into the details of this particular debate, it seems plausible 
that there is more to our everyday than mere routines and half-consciously 
encountered things and events. There are, to be sure, numerous ruptures in 
the social, material and functional frameworks of our everyday life, and not all 
such discontinuities are detrimental in nature (see e.g. Naukkarinen & 
Vasquez 2017). For our current purposes suffice to say that the pivotal point 
in the relationary account is that every aspect of our lives includes a 
foundational possibility of becoming habitual and “normalized”: what at first 
may in our eyes seem very exceptional and groundbreaking, may over time 
become the new normal to us.  
It is thus not the case that, given enough time, every possible thing in our 
surroundings will become familiar to us; the world around us fluctuates too 
much for such an outcome, and this is not what the emphasis on familiarity 
implies. Instead, what the relationary account states is that a certain amount 
of familiarity is, however, an absolute necessity for the human condition: 
without any habitual everyday relations, an outcome could not be identified as 
a meaningful experience but would resemble a chaos or a collapse of 
significances.  
There exists, however, another kind of criticism of phenomenology and 
everyday aesthetics that has to do with the givenness of our lifeworld and its 
constituents – particularly places. In order to understand the critical points 
more comprehensively, a few remarks concerning the notion of “place” are 
needed. From the viewpoint of Heideggerian phenomenology, place has an 
essential structural role in the constitution of human existence and experience 
(see e.g. Heidegger 1978, 1982; see also Haapala 1998, 2003, 2005, 2017; 
Malpas 1999, 2006, 2012a). In fact, the relationship between humans and 
places is so fundamental that Heidegger uses the term Dasein, literally 
translated as “there-being” (see e.g. Olivier 2017), to indicate the “placedness” 
of human existence. 
To be more exact, places function essentially as “mediators” in our 
relationship to the world. As worldly beings we exist in a pre-given world that 
already is full of meanings and values, and the phenomenon of world is a 
necessary “counterpart”10 of human existence; in Heideggerian terminology, 
our being is being-in-the-world. We do not, however, encounter the world as 
such, and we relate to the world from a very limited and partial perspective 
                                                 
10 “‘World’ is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a 
characteristic of Dasein itself” (Heidegger 1978, p. 92, original emphasis). 
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that is essentially bound to our place in it. According to this line of thought, it 
is places that provide us with an opening to the world (see e.g. Malpas 2012a), 
and our existence is by necessity being-in-a-place-in-the-world. It is crucial 
to note that our place, and the perspective it opens up, does not refer to a mere 
geographical or physical location but to more abstract dimensions of our 
existence, too: in addition to the inevitable socio-material constraints, our 
being is conditioned by the temporally and historically defined systems of 
meaning among which we find ourselves.  
On the basis of this, it is clear that particular places are of utmost 
importance in defining who we are and what we do, and the places of our lives 
essentially manifest the possibilities and obligations we have in this world. 
Thus places also have a central role in the formation of our lifeworld and its 
horizons, and places comprise the necessary platform on which the 
meaningfulness and the everydayness of our everyday encounters eventually 
is based. To be sure, in the course of our everyday lives places themselves are 
relatively seldom in our focus of attention, but an everyday without its 
essential places is simply unimaginable: it is the places that afford us our 
everyday actions and encounters, and place-based experiences are the basis of 
our everyday lifeworld. 
In analyzing the foundational places of our everyday lives, however, there 
is a danger lurking here. We easily end up looking for existing, pre-given places 
that seem to have a particularly remarkable status in our lives, supposedly 
telling us what is important and what is not. It is thus tempting to assign to 
certain central places a normative status that they do not necessarily deserve. 
Phenomenology has, indeed, been more or less rightly accused of normalizing 
the status quo without paying adequate attention to the structures of power 
and ideology that lie behind the givenness and the everydayness of a particular 
lifeworld. Consider, for example, the following criticism by Dovey (1999, p. 
44): 
Phenomenology should not be a quest to define some presupposed 
“sense” or “spirit” of place – it should be an opening to the world, not a 
reduction of it. Phenomenology is a necessary but limited approach to 
the understanding of place. The key problem is that the focus on the 
lifeworld can involve a certain blindness to the pronounced effects of 
social structure and ideology on such everyday experience. From this 
view a focus on experience runs the risk that the ideological framings of 
place remain buried and hence powerful.  
The argument is that when we focus on the lifeworld and on particular 
place-based experiences as its constituents, we end up analyzing phenomena 
that set the tone of our everyday, such as a sense or spirit of place. However, 
focusing on the apparent givenness of the sense or spirit of a place hinders an 
understanding of the place and its experiential character as a temporal 
process, involving notable contingencies and path-dependencies. The 
processual nature of a place experience pertains both to the material basis of 
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the experienced environment and to the experiencing subject. Generally 
speaking, the eventual experience of a place is an outcome of a lengthy 
reciprocity between humans and their environments: not only do we actively 
shape our environments, but the environments we inhabit also shape us. 
The same pattern applies to the everydayness of a place experience, and we 
cannot focus merely on describing the everydayness of a place-based everyday 
experience, for then we lose sight of the particular constituents that give rise 
to the everydayness in the first place. Above all, we lose sight of the 
contingency that is involved in the various constituents of the everydayness 
that define our relation to the place essentially as an “everyday relation.” The 
everydayness of our experience has a solid basis in a variety of elements that 
we have become used to, but this is a matter of coincidence to some degree: 
should our personal history be different, our routines and habits could be 
remarkably different, and our everyday experiences of (and in) the places we 
inhabit would also be different. 
Admittedly, there is a certain blindness to the contingencies inherent in 
every possible place experience, and the socio-historical nature of our 
experience in general has not always been properly acknowledged among 
phenomenologically-oriented theories of place. In particular, the idealized 
descriptions of certain (historical) places have somewhat hastily and naïvely 
assigned them the status of exemplary (and often foregone) human 
environments full of desirable meanings and values. Phenomenological 
accounts of place thus often represent a form of (historical) essentialism – that 
is, “the idea of place becoming an original source, the authentic source of 
meaning, the exclusive one right way” (Dovey 2016, p. 262, emphasis added). 
That being said, it should be kept in mind that phenomenology aims at 
providing an adequate description of the structure and the operations of our 
lifeworld, and this can eventually help in understanding the latent 
mechanisms behind its self-evident quality, and in assessing the built-in 
meanings and ideologies at work in the constitution of our place-based 
experience. This applies particularly to the more recent forms of 
phenomenology, such as everyday aesthetics, that aim at shedding light on 
questions of familiarity-based normalcy. It is thus crucial to notice the 
essential difference between stating that we experience something as “normal” 
and insisting that we ought to experience something as “normal.” More 
generally, analyzing the phenomenon of normalcy does not necessarily entail 
maintaining the currently prevailing conceptions of normalcy, but merely 
helps us see how certain things become taken-as-granted and thus gain a 
certain kind of normative status as something unquestioned. 
On this basis, everyday aesthetics provides us with useful tools for 
understanding the contemporary urban condition from the experiential 
viewpoint, emphasizing the role of necessary everyday experiences in the 
structuring of our urban ways of life. The perspective of everyday aesthetics is 
particularly apt in addressing questions of settling down and attaching to 
places, as well as the general meaning of home and attunement, in an era 
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characterized by mobility, ever increasing diversity of lifestyles, and fast-paced 
technological development.11 Central questions thus have to do with the 
possibility of familiarity-based normalcy in a contemporary urban 
environment. For example, where does the certain sense of continuity and 
normalcy stem from in an environment that is a materialization of a plethora 
of varying human values and intentions, manifesting thus essentially diversity 
and change? 
 
                                                 
11 These questions understandably involve empirical dimensions, and they also are important topics in 
empirical environmental psychology. Despite this, the complexity of the related phenomena poses 
serious challenges to empirical sciences, and there is an undisputable demand for more theoretical 
philosophical inquiries that focus on the conceptual dimensions of the issues. For example, it has been 
empirically verified in a relatively recent review article that the meaning of place attachment for human 
well-being has not generally decreased (see Lewicka 2011); however, it still is not entirely clear what the 
attachment exactly means, and what forms of attachment are particularly relevant in the contemporary 
condition. 
Familiarity with things and the formation of meaningful contexts 
30 
5 FAMILIARITY WITH THINGS AND THE 
FORMATION OF MEANINGFUL 
CONTEXTS 
In an article discussing the foundations of everyday aesthetics, Arto Haapala 
(2005) describes the elements that make up an everyday experience of urban 
surroundings. The related experience of “urban normalcy” is particularly 
characterized by the feeling of familiarity, in relation to individual buildings 
(Haapala 2005, p. 49): 
For many, perhaps even for most of the objects in our familiar 
surroundings, their function is simply to be present; for example, to me 
most of the houses on my street are just houses on my street. They are 
simply there as a kind of background; something that I have been used 
to. This kind of function is still a function in a weak sense; but these 
objects “do a service for us” just by being part of the familial 
surroundings, by not being strange. 
Here Haapala considers the ability of forming a necessary background for 
everyday life is a particular function of the buildings, pointing out that this is 
a remarkable feature of them, besides the more conventional functions such 
as providing shelter and enabling certain practical uses. As a part of the 
background, the buildings have a notable role in forming the urban 
environment as a context for urban life. This is a very important matter from 
the viewpoint of a more general urban condition, emphasizing the inevitable 
contextuality of the buildings: accordingly, every building (and every other 
structure, for that matter) exists in a socio-material context, fitting into the 
context either well or not so well, thus contributing to that context in one way 
or another. 
The contextuality of the buildings does not, however, refer merely to 
matters of architecture or art history, focusing on questions of coherence, 
diversity and how the buildings relate to their surroundings from the 
viewpoint of style, colors, materials, building techniques etc. These issues are, 
naturally, also of great importance regarding the overall quality of the built 
environment, but the form of contextuality that Haapala is discussing has to 
do primarily with the constitution of the urban lifeworld and the everydayness 
of our urban everyday.  
Now we have to return to the questions of functions and functionality, for 
the prevailing conceptions regarding the functions of the built environment 
seem to fall short of providing an adequate account of the effects that the 
material surroundings have on us and our everyday life. In particular, the 
tendency to conceive the functions of a built environment merely as a selection 
of various possible uses is unhelpful in gaining an understanding of the role of 
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the material dimension appropriately. No matter how many potential uses we 
recognize in our urban surroundings, the buildings and other constructions 
always do more than this: a built structure can be an apartment block, an office 
building, a retail store, a museum, a library, a school, a public transport 
terminal or all of these, but the eventual meaning of the structure simply 
cannot be exhausted by such a listing of possible uses. 
In short, the functions of a built environment are not merely a question of 
usage – i.e. of how we use these environments and why – but there are 
significantly wider issues to consider, such as how the environment serves us, 
and what kind of surroundings and contexts for living it provides for us. Thus 
we have to widen the scope of functions beyond the traditional and most 
obvious cases, and it is necessary to examine further the relationship between 
the uses of an environment and the way we experience it. In order to do so, we 
may utilize some concepts borrowed from the theory of design that approach 
the issue from the viewpoint of artifacts and their manifold functions. 
Besides providing us with certain uses, the artifacts of our everyday life 
have to make us understand which particular uses they eventually are good 
for: it is not enough that a coffee thermos keeps the coffee warm for a long 
period of time, but we also have to be able to grasp that the item can be used 
in such a way. If we do not understand that the thermos has a cap that can be 
opened, and that the composition of the thermos is such that hot liquid can be 
poured into it (without the seams of the bottle leaking, or materials getting 
damaged), it is of no use to us. This capacity of an artifact to communicate to 
us its intended use can been called its “denotative function” (Muller 2001; see 
also Verbeek 2005, pp. 204–205), essentially indicating that the artifact is 
somehow able to denote its primary use, thus making itself understandable 
and useful to us. 
The same applies to the built environment: if the elements of an 
environment do not reveal their uses to us promptly enough, we do not know 
how to make use of the environment and we will end up getting frustrated with 
it. For example, if we do not recognize the entrance to building, or we do not 
easily understand the opening mechanism of a door, the building has 
difficulties in fulfilling its function, and it is reasonable to consider the 
possibility of a downright design error. However, less obvious examples also 
exist in the urban realm: if a public park is surrounded by an overly hostile 
fence, or if a publicly owned and freely accessible shoreline has the same 
appearance and general atmosphere as the backyards of the nearby houses, 
the recreational functions of these places are compromised due to an apparent 
failure in the denotative dimension of functionality.  
In addition to the denotative functions, artifacts and the entities in the built 
environment serve other kinds of “immaterial” functions, which are usually 
more subtle and require more interpretation. For example, the coffee thermos 
gives rise to certain images and involves implicit references to a certain kind 
of lifestyle. The imagery related to camping and other activities in nature are 
very strongly attached to the thermos. If one merely sees a thermos on the shelf 
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of a retail store, one easily begins to visualize oneself sitting around a campfire, 
far away from the obligations and the pressures characteristic of our everyday, 
or one is prone to reminisce about the moments spent in nature with one’s 
dearest friends – perhaps in an overly nostalgic and romanticizing way. This 
attribute of an artifact can be called its “connotative function” (Muller 2001; 
see also Verbeek 2005, pp. 205–207), referring to the fact that in addition to 
its primary use, an artifact is always the bearer of various socio-cultural 
meanings. 
It is clear that the elements of built environments have innumerable 
connotative functions, and there is no way to provide an exhaustive account of 
them. The cultural connotations that, say, a building gives rise to are not 
entirely universal, but depend on a variety of factors, such as experiential 
history, that can be personal or shared merely among a specific reference 
group. Despite this, there are many relatively common features in our culture-
specific ways of interpreting our environment, so that the connotations can 
also be – and de facto are – anticipated when planning and designing the 
urban environment.  
Just as speculating about the connotations of artifacts comprises a major 
part of a contemporary industrial design process – playing with existing 
connotations and creating new ones is a central method of differentiating 
products toward the lifestyles of target groups and desirable consumer types 
(see Muller 2001) – present-day urban design pays significant attention to the 
socio-cultural meanings that the urban environment supposedly represents 
(see e.g. Bell & Jayne 2003; Julier 2000; Robins 1993). This is also the starting 
point for place-making policies and practices that aim at deliberately creating 
meaningful, livable and sustainable places (see e.g. Kovács & Musterd 2013; 
Knox 2005; Lister 2012; Palermo & Ponzini 2015). 
The evident challenge here is that the urban environment comprises the 
necessary habitat for the masses, and these urbanites generally cannot choose 
whether or not to take part in the postmodern “symbolic play” that 
characterizes the deliberate differentiation of design-products. What is 
particularly problematic is that the connotations inherent in a built 
environment might not always be as innocent as in the case of the coffee 
thermos, and the commonly used connotations resonate with the lifestyle of a 
relatively small amount of prosperous and wealthy people. However, every 
building and structure in one’s urban surroundings represents a very specific 
set of values, whether we like it or not: they pose a silent yet effective 
imperative on us, as they promote a certain way of life and assert its superiority 
over others. 
Despite many theories of design are apparently putting a notable emphasis 
on the symbols, signs, and “languages” that the design-products utilize in 
providing their connotative functions (see e.g. Verbeek 2005), the 
representation of values occurs both at a symbolic and at a more primordial 
sensory level. Hence, in addition to the recognizable value-laden symbols 
(such as logos and various written messages), the very concrete and sensory 
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features of the environment also can – and do – manifest values. For example, 
the glass-clad skyscrapers eerily looming above us very effectively remind us 
of corporate power, and the impenetrable mirror-glassed surfaces tangibly 
embody the possibility of looking out but not looking in and foster an 
atmosphere of constant surveillance. This is merely another way of stating that 
sensing and interpretation are essentially intertwined and, as Scruton (1994) 
puts it, appearances are saturated by meanings. 
Summarizing, denotative and connotative functions are about the sphere 
of experience and interpretation, and with making the world appear in a 
particular way: recognizing the role of such functions implies that we 
necessarily relate to useful things and their use-based functions via 
interpretative experience. Thus uses have to be sensible to us in both meanings 
of the word: uses must be sensed, and they have to make sense to us. These 
classifications of denotative and connotative function also help us to 
understand how we integrate various functional entities as parts of our 
existing lifeworld – both at the level of concrete practices (recognizing the 
ways of use) and at the level of abstract meanings (recognizing socio-cultural 
relevance). 
If we now consider the function of “being present as a familiar background” 
that Haapala was discussing, it is clear that this is not a traditional use-based 
function. But it does not seem to fall neatly into the categories of denotative 
and connotative functions either: being part of a background does not 
seemingly reveal any other function of the building, neither does it refer to any 
specific socio-cultural meanings. Despite this, being part of the background 
has essentially to do with how we experience and interpret the immediate 
environment.12 The fact that the building is familiar to us, and not strange, 
contributes to the overall appearance and the experiential essence of that 
particular spot in the urban make-up. The familiarity of the building has to do 
with the constitution and the meaningful appearance of that particular place. 
The familiar buildings, for their part, define the place as a place that affords 
us certain things and not others, and as a place that reminds us of the values 
                                                 
12 Such an observation indicates the apparent shortcomings related to typical postmodern theories of 
meaning and experience, relying substantively on the dichotomy of denotation and connotation. This is 
particularly relevant from our current point of view, since certain branches of contemporary urban 
design still seem to conceive the phenomenon of urban experience in a manner similar to the postmodern 
stance, even though the concepts of denotation and connotation may not be explicitly mentioned. 
Summarizing, various denotative and connotative functions do exist in our urban environments, and the 
concepts of denotation and connotation might indeed be useful in understanding the overall 
functionalities of our environments; nevertheless, we cannot rely merely on these concepts in order to 
understand the constitution and essence of our interpretative urban experience thoroughly, but we need 
some further conceptualizations that essentially complement the previous theories. 
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underlying our ways of lives.13 In other words, the buildings have denotative 
and connotative functions with regard to the place they are part of, not with 
regard to themselves. Here we cannot merely examine the functions of the 
buildings in isolation, but we have to look for their function as a part of the 
surrounding urban structure, thus also influencing the lifeworlds that are 
based in that particular material environment. Hence, the familiar buildings 
are of crucial importance concerning the adequacy of the place as a context for 
living, and their function as “being present as a familiar background” is 
essentially a context-forming function, contributing to the contextuality of the 
place as a necessary platform for the urban lifeworlds.  
The everydayness of a place – and thus the role of a place in the constitution 
of the urban everyday – has its basis in the familiarity of the constituents of 
that place. The familiar buildings form one dimension of the general 
constellation of the place they are part of, and the fact that they are familiar, 
and not strange, in a way “increases” the overall familiarity of the place. The 
more familiar the place becomes to us, the more it becomes contextual and 
taken-for-granted, and the less thematization and conscious attention it 
demands. This is also why the phenomenon of place is so important in 
everyday aesthetics, for places seem to serve as an intermediary step in the 
processes of familiarization, bridging the gap between particular familiar 
entities and the givenness of the lifeworld. 
However, as the context of our experience, the lifeworld consists of 
perceptual, practical and cultural horizons that all play their part in the 
process of things achieving an “everyday” status: becoming accustomed to 
things occurs at the levels of sensing, usage, and interpretation. This applies 
to places too, so that the familiarity with regard to the perceptual, practical 
and cultural dimensions of a place all play a part in the place becoming a 
context for everyday life. In order to understand more comprehensively the 
contextual nature of urban everyday places and the role that the particular 
constituents of places have regarding that contextuality, we need further 
conceptual tools in order to analyze the presence of place-based entities. Of 
particular interest is the presence of familiar entities, for these are the ones 
that eventually give rise to the contextuality of places. 
The previous example regarding the coffee maker as an equipmental entity 
in a familiar environment (the kitchen at home) is helpful: we make use of this 
device relatively effortlessly, for we know the whereabouts of all the related 
utensils (ground coffee, filter papers, coffee mugs, etc.), and we also know how 
to make use of them. We are thus familiar with the equipmental whole that is 
needed to brew the coffee that eventually results in a cup of hot refreshing 
liquid, lending some extra significance to the break it affords in the middle a 
                                                 
13 Of course, people are generally not entirely free to choose their habitat – there are usually numerous 
things to be considered at the same time – but we tend to favor such environs that also satisfy us 
spiritually and thus reflect our values. 
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busy day. This essentially contributes to the familiarity of the kitchen and its 
role as a (small-scale) contextual place in our everyday. 
As pieces of equipment, the coffee maker and its related items normally 
withdraw from the focus of our attention into the background of our 
consciousness, and they become more or less invisible to us. Despite this, they 
are still somehow present to us and, above all, they actively influence the way 
we experience our surroundings. In short, the equipmental items not only 
provide us with certain possibilities and outcomes, but they eventually make 
us perceive the world in terms of these possibilities and outcomes.  
A very concrete historical example of this is the introduction the 
hydroelectric power plants: only after the idea of hydroelectricity was properly 
developed – and perhaps after the experimental and very small-scale power 
plants were successfully established – were those previously freely running 
streams of water perceived as a considerable source of electric power. The 
introduction of new technology and their related technical devices 
significantly altered our conceptions and our experience of the surrounding 
(natural) environment. 
The same logic also applies to much more mundane and less dramatic 
devices and tools, though it is usually the equipmental whole and not a 
particular piece of equipment that conditions our everyday experiences of 
things, places and events. The equipmental wholes are also amalgamated with 
the practices of making use of the whole. For example, it is the set of coffee-
making utensils and the related practice of brewing coffee that makes us see 
the ground coffee as something on which hot water should be poured, the filter 
paper as an adequate holder for the ground coffee, the mug as a temporary 
container for the resulting liquid and, eventually, the kitchen as a potential 
place for such activities.  
Without the practice of brewing coffee, such an interpretation of these 
items would not be possible (it would not make any sense), and without the 
existence of these items such a practice would not exist. As we become 
acquainted to certain practices by means of using certain kinds of equipment, 
the seemingly indifferent and neutral appearances of things are suddenly full 
of meanings. Becoming familiar with equipment thus means that we begin the 
see the world “through” them, in accordance with the things they afford us. 
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6 POSTPHENOMENOLOGY AND THE 
MEDIATING ROLE OF TECHNOLOGIES 
We have here described the foundational idea behind the branch of philosophy 
called postphenomenology. The focus of postphenomenology is on the 
relations between humans and their world, and particularly on the useful 
things that effectively condition, steer and form these relations. The overall 
effects of such things on our worldly being can be described with the term 
“mediation”: innumerable useful things mediate our experience and existence, 
and we cannot imagine the human condition that would not be based on the 
various forms of mediation. Consider the following extract from Peter-Paul 
Verbeek (2005, p. 235), crystallizing the fundamentals of 
postphenomenology: 
In [the postphenomenological] perspective the relation between human 
beings and their world takes center stage, and are viewed as mutually 
constituting each other – human beings are what they are thanks to the ways 
in which they are present in their world, and their world is what it is thanks to 
how it appears to them. Things play a role precisely in this relation between 
human beings and world. This relation happens “via” things: human beings 
act with the help of artifacts and perceive [the world] through them. This role 
of things can be characterized as “mediation.” Thanks to their mediating roles 
things help to shape the way in which human beings are involved with their 
world and interpret it. Things – and in our current culture especially 
technological artifacts – mediate how human beings are present in their world 
and how world is present to them; they shape both subjectivity and objectivity. 
As Verbeek here mentions, postphenomenology has a particular focus on 
technological artifacts or technologies, and their mediating role in the 
relationships between humans and their world. Another proponent of 
postphenomenological thinking, Don Ihde (2009, p. 23), who in a way is its 
founder,14 has described postphenomenology as a hybrid of phenomenology 
and pragmatism, setting as its objective “to probe and analyze the role of 
technologies in social, personal, and cultural life” by means of concrete 
empirical studies of “technologies in plural.” 
For example, one can think of a contemporary mass rapid transportation 
system like the metro: the existence of the metro has irreversibly affected our 
conceptions of what a contemporary urban environment is and what kind of 
activities are possible, presumable and desirable in such an environment. For 
us, it is not at all surprising or astonishing that one is able to move tens of 
                                                 
14 Postphenomenological thinking owes much to Ihde’s pivotal arguments in the field of philosophy of 
technology in the 1970s, even though the scope of postphenomenology has widened considerably since 




kilometers between two places within a dense and crowded urban structure in 
a matter of minutes, consuming only a relatively small amount of money. To 
be sure, this is merely a raw fact, according to which we arrange our daily lives. 
For a person living in a relatively chaotic city a few centuries ago, however, this 
would easily count as a nonsensical idea that some silly utopian thinker might 
have aired out loud. In short, we have become used to the idea of the metro 
inasmuch as we take it for granted and we cannot imagine a true metropolis 
without a comprehensive metro system. 
Beyond the level of abstract concepts and conceptions, the metro also has 
affected our concrete behavior, as well as our immediate experience of the city 
at many different levels. When we need to get around, we start looking for the 
symbols indicating a metro station, if we do not know the location of the 
nearest one. We also de facto travel through the immediate surroundings of 
the metro stations more often than other parts of the city, so that the vicinities 
of the stations become experientially familiar to us, even though we have no 
special interest in them. Finally, we even conceive the urban structure 
according to the network of metro stations, so that it seemingly consists of 
interconnected nodes, though there is no direct equivalent to such a 
configuration in the physical reality above ground. 
On this basis, one could think that the metro somehow confuses or distorts 
our relationship to the urban environment, emphasizing quite arbitrarily 
certain dimensions and neglecting others, but this is an incorrect conclusion 
in that it presupposes a “neutral” environmental relationship that would have 
existed before the introduction of the metro. From the postphenomenological 
perspective it is crucial to understand that the metro simply has a notable 
mediatory role regarding our relationship to our environment – and, 
eventually, to the world – providing us with certain types of use and action 
that entail certain types of urban experiences. 
Despite an apparent emphasis on technology, it is not always entirely clear 
what, exactly, counts as a “technology” from the postphenomenological 
perspective, and why. In any case, postphenomenology does not aim to 
provide a universal but still informative definition of technology (e.g. by listing 
certain necessary and sufficient conditions), for such an enterprise is very 
likely doomed to fail. The impossibility of such a task derives mainly from the 
inexhaustible diversity and the temporal quality of technology as a 
phenomenon, which postphenomenology takes as its starting point (see, e.g. 
Verbeek 2005). 
Acknowledging that technology is a historical phenomenon that a single 
all-encompassing definition cannot do justice to, one is still tempted to expect 
some kind of delineation of technologies, since surely not every possible thing 
is “a technology,” or should be regarded as such. In other words, we de facto 
categorize the world in terms of things that are technological, and things that 
are not technological, and such categorizations are not indifferent but involve 
notable questions of valuation. To be more exact, the degree of 
“technologicality” of an artifact or other entity has notable and indisputable 
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bearings on our experience of it, regarding both experiential meanings and 
values. 
One can consider, for example, the differences in the “technologicality” of 
certain building materials, and the varying experiential outcomes that these 
differences result in. Many so-called natural materials – such as wood, stone 
and even burnt brick – tend to give rise to experiences of warmth, coziness and 
intimacy, whereas more processed materials – such as glass, steel and concrete 
– are intuitively associated with coldness, formality and distance (see e.g. 
Böhme 2017, pp. 60–62). The point here is that all of these materials are de 
facto more or less processed and are thus presumably technological to some 
degree (the usage of completely untreated wood or stone is nowadays very 
rare, as even the mere cutting into a form is a kind of treatment), but the 
amount of processing is apparently of utmost significance from the 
experiential point of view. 
Without engaging in a burdensome search for the “essence” of technology, 
it seems justifiable to claim that the role of human agency is of crucial 
importance here. For example, a tree in itself apparently cannot be regarded 
as a technological entity, whereas a tree planted by a human – with some 
particular intention in mind – can be. Planting rows of deciduous trees along 
streets of a certain width is de facto a fire-preventing strategy that was used in 
Finnish cities particularly in the nineteenth century (see Kirjakka 1996), but it 
is open to debate whether this is a fire-preventing technology. 
Such a historical practice of preventing fires clearly bears some 
resemblance to “more archetypal” forms of technology – it is an instance of 
utilizing natural resources according to particular human intentions – but, in 
any case, it does not represent any kind of particularly high or complex 
technology. Indeed, the crucial feature of being capable of hindering and 
perhaps stopping fires comes from the trees themselves – healthy and 
flourishing deciduous trees can store significant amounts of water, and they 
do not catch fire very easily – and not from the human operations, so that such 
a fire-preventing technology has a significantly low degree of refinement. 
From the viewpoint of functions, the case of deciduous trees as a fire-
preventing technology illustrates the diversity, indeterminacy, and even the 
arbitrariness of the functions that a particular material-level solution may give 
rise to. In addition to the original, very technical and rationally justified 
function of increasing fire safety in Finnish towns, the solution has remarkably 
altered the way people conceive old town centres in Finland today – both 
conceptually and at the level of experience. Indeed, from a contemporary point 
of view, the lush rows of deciduous trees that change their appearance with 
each season simply belong to the Finnish townscape, and a lack of such trees 
is regarded generally as a serious shortcoming. Regarding daily life in such 
urban surroundings, the trees essentially enrich the urban experience, shaping 
and giving depth to the local character and its related aesthetic values. In short, 
the trees are nowadays an essential part of “an urban aesthetic” and accorded 
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a remarkably high value that would have been very hard if not altogether 
impossible to predict in mid-nineteenth century Finland.  
In order to understand more profoundly the contingency and path-
dependency involved in all functions – but especially in those affordances with 
a human origin – the postphenomenological notion of “multistability” is 
particularly useful, referring to “the ever-present potential for a technology to 
be used in multiple ways through multiple contexts” (Rosenberger 2014, p. 
373). Generally speaking this means that, say, a hammer can be used in 
hammering – as its designer may have originally intended – but also as a 
paperweight, an art object, a murder weapon, etc. according to the intentions 
of the current user, and the features of the particular context (Ihde 1993; see 
also Rosenberger 2014 & Verbeek 2005). Multistability does not mean an 
arbitrariness of possible uses, as the material basis of the technology – “the 
particularities of its physical composition” (Rosenberger 2014, p. 377) – 
essentially limits the set of potential uses: a hammer simply cannot be used as 
a means of transportation, no matter how much one may try to interpret it in 
such a way. 
The multistability of technologies refers, however, primarily to the 
dimension of use, whereas the multistability of functions can involve 
phenomena that apparently fall outside the conventional scope of “use”: in 
addition to the various intended and unintended uses, environmental 
functions can and do shape our experience, as do the more general conceptions 
regarding the essence of that particular environment, which the example of 
the deciduous trees illustrates. The planted deciduous trees have, indeed, 
served the intended function of preventing fires, but also various other 
functions, such as an “aesthetic function” of contributing to the general 
environmental quality, especially when the trees have grown bigger (Kirjakka 
1996). According to the idea of multistability, the related aesthetic function 
has been, in a way, inscribed in the materiality of the particular technology – 
that is, the rows of trees – but the realization of such a function has been 
dependent on external conditions (for example, that the trees have not been 
used as firewood, or that they have not been regarded as visual obstacles and 
thus been cut down). 
The possibility of delineating technology to some extent may be of 
particular significance with regard to addressing urban environments. This is 
due to the fact that there are countless entities in the urban sphere that are 
similar to, or analogous with, the above-mentioned example of urban trees, 
and it is not entirely clear whether the fundamentals of technology-oriented 
postphenomenology can be applied to these “semi-technological” dimensions 
as such. In any case, postphenomenological thinking also has clearly 
significant applications in analyzing contemporary urban life, as the following 
example by Asle Kiran (2012, p. 83) demonstrates: 
A car driver takes roads and tunnels for granted and may never ever 
think of them as being part of his technologically structured lifeworld. 
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[...] [Such] background technologies profoundly influence the social 
environment we move around in; they shape the way we live in or 
perceive our own lifeworld. 
In a similar manner, a pedestrian takes sidewalks, crosswalks and parks for 
granted, possibly never paying attention to the fact that such features of an 
urban environment have been planned, built and maintained by someone. 
Moreover, these features essentially shape not only the pedestrians’ direct and 
concrete experience of their immediate surroundings, but also their indirect 
and thus more abstract conceptions of what an urban environment is, or could 
be, or ought to be. It is not, however, entirely clear whether all these features 
can, or should be, counted as technologies, or whether they are merely entities 
that provide us with such functionalities that form the usually unnoticed and 
thus taken-for-granted backdrop of our everyday lives. Thus what is 
particularly important about these elements of urban surroundings is perhaps 
not the fact that they are manifestations of background technologies, but that 
they form a specific set of background relations. 
The background relations form one main category of the Ihdean fourfold 
relations15 regarding technologically mediated human-world relationships – 
the category that focuses on technologies that tend to remain “aside” due to 
their composition and the ways they are used. Ihde (1979, p. 13–14, emphasis 
added) describes these background relations as a salient dimension in our 
contemporary technology-saturated society that constantly and inevitably 
condition our being and our daily experiences: 
[I]n an increasingly more complex technological society more and more 
human-machine relations take on “atmospheric” characteristics in 
terms of the machine background. [...] I neither relate through these 
[mundane] machines, nor explicitly, except momentarily, to them. Yet 
at the same time I live in their midst, often not noticing their 
surrounding presence. 
Yet their surrounding presence is almost constant. For example, in the 
here and now we may meet in the presence of lights, the warmth 
provided by our semi-automatic heating systems, and in many modern 
buildings in which there is a total environmental control by way of 
technological artifacts [;] we may be said to be “inside” a machine. 
What is particularly noteworthy in such atmospheric background relations 
is their somewhat ambiguous relation to the sphere of conscious experience: 
they are not entirely transparent, but not entirely opaque either – they are not 
entirely absent, but not entirely present either (Ihde 1990). Ihde ends up using 
the term “present absence,” indicating that despite its non-focal quality, the 
                                                 
15 According to Ihde, the main categories of the human–technology–world relations are: 1. embodiment 
relation, 2. hermeneutic relation, 3. alterity relation, and 4. background relation (see Ihde 1979, 1990, 
1993; see also e.g. Kiran 2012; Nørskov 2015; Verbeek 2005). 
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technology “nevertheless becomes part of the experienced field of the 
inhabitant, a piece of the immediate environment” (Ihde 1990, p. 109). 
Such a description of the (technological) background-like components of 
our experience implies above all that a phenomenological stance involving an 
overly strict division between the thematized focus and the contextual 
background is insufficient in providing an adequate and informative account 
of what constitutes our lifeworld and our everyday encounters with things. 
Even though Ihde deals primarily with technologies, his remarks have a 
considerably wider scope of application, opening up new vistas to our 
relationship to equipmental entities in general – and to the entire 
environments that largely consist of such equipmental entities. 
As Asle Kiran (2012, p. 83–84, emphasis altered) has argued, the specific 
mode of presence called “present absent” may not pertain merely to proper 
background technologies, but it may also be appropriately applied to other 
kinds of technologies, representing the other categories of the Ihdean fourfold 
relations:  
[W]e need to highlight the specific presence “background” technologies 
can have even when they, as artefacts, remain in the background [...] 
Also technologies that go into the ordinary technology relations but 
whose mediating function is not actualized can be seen to harbor a 
similar aspect. For instance, the ready availability of the telephone 
might seem to be, at most, a background relation although the actual 
use is not. However, knowing that we can call, or be called upon, is also 
an aspect to how we organize our lives. 
The point here is that the “ordinary” (i.e. not background-like) technologies 
are also present to us as a kind of background to our lives when they are not in 
use. Hence their overall significance to our worldly existence cannot be 
exhausted by focusing merely on their “proper” functions and their related 
ways of mediation. The specific way in which currently unused devices and 
other tools are present in our experience has, in turn, a considerable effect on 
the overall composition of that experience, having notable influences on the 
constitution of our lifeworld. 
This observation, however, reveals the “blind spot” of current 
postphenomenology: typical postphenomenological accounts fall short of 
explicating how, exactly, the “ready availability” of devices, and how that being 
“an aspect to how we organize our lives,” manifest themselves experientially 
and at the level of experiential quality? Despite the fact that 
postphenomenology relies on the hermeneutical concept of “interpretation” – 
and that it builds on examining the technologically conditioned and thus 
historical ways of perceiving the world – there seems to be an unexplained and 
somewhat troublesome emphasis on what we perceive, and not so much on 
how we perceive. To exaggerate slightly, for postphenomenology the world 
consists of things, and not so much the qualities of these things. 
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7 AFFORDANCES AND THE PERCEIVED 
QUALITY OF AN ENVIRONMENT 
In order to tackle such problems, and in order to provide necessary room for 
acknowledging the role of experiential quality and aesthetic matters in the 
constitution of our everyday experiences, we need to double-check how the 
functionality of technologies is understood in postphenomenological thinking. 
When addressing the mediatory role of various technologies, and the related 
contingencies inherent in the context of application, it is tempting to scrutinize 
the various “uses” of particular technologies: for example, the concept of 
“multistability” refers specifically to “the ever-present potential for a 
technology to be used in multiple ways through multiple contexts” 
(Rosenberger 2014, p. 373). The question of which use appears to be the 
primary one, and why, remains more or less unanswered. There are, of course, 
the intentions of the user, but we de facto perceive innumerable technological 
devices and other tools without currently having in mind any specific 
intentions concerning them, and we still perceive them essentially as 
meaningful entities serving certain functions and not other ones.  
It seems that our interpretations regarding the functionalities of things are 
highly context-sensitive, pointing to the fact that we tend to encounter them 
primarily in certain kinds of socio-material environments, as parts of 
particular spatially arranged equipmental wholes. Our experience of such 
equipmental environments is, in turn, conditioned by the various 
functionalities that comprise our everyday practices that ultimately form the 
basis of our lifeworld. In other words, we see the environment in terms of how 
we are used to utilizing it, and thus in terms of what we are used to seeing: we 
have learned to perceive certain uses and not others. This process of learning 
must have a pragmatic basis – related eventually to the cost-efficiency of our 
perception – so that we do not have to start interpreting our environments 
from scratch, which would consume our time and cognitive resources simply 
too much. 
In order to acknowledge the pragmatic nature of all environmental 
experiences and the role of related learning processes adequately enough, an 
alternative term for describing our relationship to the functionalities of an 
environment is needed. Consider the following quote by the 
postphenomenologists Kiran and Verbeek (2010, p. 417, emphasis added): 
[A] piece of equipment influences the world to appear for us in a manner 
that is in accordance with its affordances. A claw hammer [...] affords 
rock hard hits and pulling things, which points it toward a context that 
includes nails and spikes, items that in turn afford hitting or pulling. 
The nails and the spikes stick out from a background, the world, because 
of the hammer. 
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Here the authors employ the notion “affordance,” a term originating in the 
1960s from the ecological perceptual psychologist James J. Gibson, though the 
most well-known formulations are from his 1979 book The Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception. In general, “affordance” refers to the 
possibilities of use and action in an environment for an experiencing agent, 
thus exceeding the scope of term “use” in highlighting the crucial role of the 
context and the user’s experiential perspective from the very beginning (see 
e.g. Jones 2003).  
What is for our present purposes the most important dimension in 
affordances is the level of conventionality and normativity inherent in 
perceiving them. Affordances belong to specific forms of life, and they 
comprise a description of conventional ways of utilizing the innumerable 
possibilities of an environment: a certain regularity and the relative stability 
of behavioral patterns constitute practices that, in turn, define the normative 
dimension of the behavior (see e.g. Bloomfield et al. 2010; Menatti & Casado 
da Rocha 2016; Raudaskoski 2009; Rietveld & Kiverstein 2014; van Dijk & 
Rietveld 2017). Becoming a member of the particular form of life thus means 
learning to make use of the environment according to the prevailing 
conventions, but also learning to distinguish between correct and incorrect 
instantiations of the context-sensitive behavior.  
When one has truly internalized the “normal way” of relating to the 
plethora of affordances – that is, when one has become a full-blown member 
of the form of life,  a “skilled agent” (Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014) – such 
normative assessments occur automatically and without conscious 
consideration and reflection. One simply perceives what action the specific 
situation demands, as well as the correct affordances that it is presumed one 
will make use of. 
An extreme case of the normativity involved in affordances takes place 
when we begin to see certain possibilities of use and action as objective 
features of a thing or an environment, but at the same time not seeing any 
other possibilities as relevant alternatives to the established ones. This is an 
example of learning to attach meanings to things so firmly that we do not even 
recognize any other possible choices, or that there would have been any real 
options available in the first place. Such instances can be called “canonical 
affordances” (see Costall 2012 & 2014), referring to the self-evidence and the 
normality of certain deeply conventionalized ways of use and action. 
Canonical affordances represent an ultimate form of familiarity with regard 
to the functionalities of things and environments. Hence, it is the canonical 
affordances of things and environments that tend to form the background of 
our everyday experience: we take them for granted, so that we can focus on 
dealing with some other less familiar and perhaps more demanding 
affordances. Canonical affordances also allow us a half-conscious relation to 
various environments that are similar enough, even though we might not be 
so acquainted with them at the level of details. 
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Thus canonical affordances are of specific importance regarding the 
familiarization with new and strange environments and their places: we 
immediately recognize such affordances of any place that generally have 
“canonical status” in our eyes. However, in familiar places other, more 
nuanced and intricate affordances may become canonical to us too, and 
becoming used to the details and idiosyncrasies of a place considerably alters 
the quality of our experiential relationship to that place (see e.g. Kaplan, 
Kaplan & Ryan 1998). 
Normativity also prevails with regard to these more nuanced and intricate 
place-based affordances, giving rise to the conventionalization of more 
personal and reference group-specific relations to a place and its experiential 
character. To be more exact, the experiential character of a place is, at least 
partially, the outcome of the processes of familiarization and canonization, 
thus manifesting the correspondence, as well as the possible tensions,16 
between the experiencing agent and the place.  
There is another aspect related to the normativity of affordances that has 
to do with perceiving the correspondence between the agent and the 
environment. The theoretical framework of affordances relies primarily on a 
systemic and holistic view concerning individual actors in their environments, 
as it aims to assess the fit between the environment and the individual actor. 
Affordance-based psychological studies thus typically aim to examine how well 
the environment satisfies the needs and the desires of the individual.  
According to the central argument of ecological psychology, environmental 
“aesthetic preferences” – understood as something comprising the overall 
perceived quality of an environment, not as a set of reflectively and 
deliberately chosen “likings” – are themselves a perceptual manifestation of 
the fit. The argument goes that there is an aesthetic preference for 
environments that apparently correspond to the fundamental needs and 
desires of an experiencing agent, the individual thus being “intuitively drawn 
away from unpromising places and towards places that afford more positive 
opportunities” (Kaplan 1987, p. 24). Hence there is an implicit aesthetic 
incentive within our experience that leads us to inhabit such environments 
that involve more beneficial affordances than neutral or detrimental ones. 
The kind of aesthetic preferences and the related aesthetic reactions that 
the evolutionary and ecological psychology aim to describe are automatic and 
unconscious by nature, and they represent a form of economical and cost-
efficient way of recognizing the environment as an environment that can be 
used in order to do or gain something. Put briefly, the aesthetic reactions serve 
as an efficient way of categorizing and classifying, as well as estimating and 
                                                 
16 It must be remembered that there are many places that have an oppressive experiential character and 
negative connotations, and not all canonical affordances of a place are positive by nature. The term 
“correspondence” is used here in a neutral meaning, referring merely to the amount of shared history, 
not taking any stance on whether this history is has a positive or a negative general tone. 
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evaluating, our surroundings – from the viewpoint of affordances (see Kaplan 
1987). 
Aesthetic preferences guide our choices not merely between different 
places, but also within particular places, and these choices are based on our 
perception of the particular place-based affordances. In other words, the 
perceived quality of an environment is an approximation regarding the 
suitability of the place-based affordances, and such approximations are made 
between places and within places. The assessment of the perceived quality is, 
in turn, based on our previous experiences of known environments and their 
affordances, for we have learnt to classify and evaluate new and strange 
environments on the basis of more familiar ones. Through this automated 
ability of classifying and evaluating, we also gain a specific experiential 
relationship to the most familiar surroundings, which eventually gives rise to 
the aesthetic qualities of homely environments. 
The general economical imperative of our perceptive processes implies that 
we have to favor such methods of observation that use our scarce resources 
efficiently. We simply cannot afford to needlessly fixate on such familiar 
features of our familiar environments that we already know on the basis of 
various previous encounters with them. In accordance with this, it can be said 
that we perceive familiar environmental affordances peripherally,17 meaning 
that we acknowledge them without consciousness of either the affordances, or 
of the act of acknowledging itself. Peripheral perception applies also to places, 
meaning that we perceive the qualities of place-based affordances directly – 
we do not have to rely on any mental representations (see Raymond et al. 2017) 
– but essentially in a non-focused and non-thematizing way.  
This is another way of expressing the meaning of the “atmospheric 
characteristics” of the manifold background relations in our environments: we 
live among affordances, our place-based existence constantly being 
conditioned by the possibilities of that place, surrounding us like an 
atmosphere that is simultaneously present yet still absent. The direct but non-
focused perceptual relation we have to all environments and their affordances 
can also be called “atmospheric perception” (see Pallasmaa 2014). Such 
mechanism of perception is of specific importance in our most familiar 
environments and places, in which we are atmospherically aware of all their 
relevant functionalities and other features. We simply do not have to pay any 
specific attention to place-based affordances that are canonical to us, and the 
                                                 
17 “Peripheral perception” is a concept developed by Juhani Pallasmaa (see e.g. 2014), referring primarily 
to those dimensions of an environment that we primordially grasp without understanding them 
intellectually. Pallasmaa focuses on relatively abstract phenomena, such as atmospheres and the 
characteristics of a particular situation, but the concept can arguably be applied much more widely, 
covering an entire branch or subspecies of our environmental relationship. 
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“functional essence” of these homely places is present to us via the specific 
experiential character of those places. 18 
                                                 
18 On this basis, it seems that the background-like relations and their atmospheric characteristics are 
closely connected to something akin to Heidegger’s concept of Befindlichkeit, which has been translated 
as “affectivity,” “attunement,” “disposedness” and even “state-of-mind,” to name a few alternatives (see 
Slaby 2021). In any case, Befindlichkeit comprises an ontological structure of Dasein’s being, referring 
specifically to our way of existence as being-in-the-world. In Heideggerian terminology, Befindlichkeit 
is the ontological counterpart of Stimmungen (“moods”), and “as the ontic manifestation of 
Befindlichkeit, Stimmungen are the various and specific ways in which Dasein can relate to and disclose 
the world, all of which occur against the backdrop of the structure of Befindlichkeit” (Elpidorou & 
Freeman 2015, p. 663). Moods, in turn, are something that Heidegger likens to atmospheres that have a 
crucial role in our existence, since we eventually exist in them, or through them: “[moods] are not some 
inner, private, or subjective states of Being. Instead, moods are the pervasive medium or lens through 
which the world is disclosed to us, and in existing, we constantly find ourselves in them” (Elpidorou & 
Freeman 2015, p. 664). As a medium through which we are related to the world and to the wordly things, 
moods “affect and to an extent even determine how things appear to us” (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015, 
p. 664, emphasis added). Moods thus have essentially to do with the experiential quality of our relation 
to things and the surroundings (the places) they are part of. On this basis, it seems that the form of 
“atmospheric perception” we have discussed above could be described as a distinct form or subcategory 
of moods, referring to the specific unobtrusiveness and givenness of our everyday environments and 
their entities. In other words, the amount of familiarity we have with our most typical environments is 
such that we eventually end up relating to them through such moods that their inherent possibilities of 
use and action (i.e. the place-based affordances) gain “atmospheric chracteristics,” and thus are present 
to us as something “absent.” These considerations remain, however, mere curiosities, indicating that 
there are salient connections between Heidegger’s original formulations and the more applied stance we 
have developed here. As was shown above, there are, for instance, several more or less established 
(English) translations for the term Befindlichkeit; therefore Heideggerian original terminology might 
not always be as operational and useful as one would wish, so that a relatively wide selection of possible 
interpretations eventually hinders developing further applications. This is the ultimate reason why the 
original terminology is not utilized more extensively in the thesis. 
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8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A satisfactory or thriving environmental relationship that is primarily based 
on the described atmospheric awareness is possible only if an environment 
consists of places that we experience as familiar enough to us. Hence 
considerable changes in such an environment may shake the delicate balance 
of our environmental relationship at least temporarily, perhaps even 
permanently. The atmospherically sensed experiential quality of our habitat is 
the outcome of a lengthy process of familiarization with our environment – of 
sharing a history with it, and even growing with it – and the nuances in our 
personal experiential relationship with our “home environments” cannot be 
grasped from an external point of view in their full richness. 
The experiential quality of an environment – which is a major theme in 
everyday aesthetics – plays an important part as a mediating structure in the 
process of the peripheral or atmospheric perception of place-based 
affordances. As peripheral perception entails an “ease of interpretation” of an 
environment, the specific experiential quality that lies behind such an efficient 
mode of perception has many far-reaching yet poorly recognized 
repercussions for our environmental relationship. This experiential quality 
affects, among other things, our conceptions of how well the environment and 
its affordances satisfy our needs and desires, as well as how well it resonates 
with our ideals and values regarding life in general.  
Using the terminology of environmental psychology, it is not merely the 
objective fit between ourselves and our environment that matters, but also our 
personal experience of this fit, especially when assessing our habitat from the 
viewpoint of comprehensive well-being. Experiential quality and its 
components thus need to be taken into account from the very beginning, not 
merely as a minor theme that can be ameliorated after the city is developed 
(cf. Dovey & Pafka 2020). Abstract experiential issues – such as those related 
to aesthetic values and meanings inherent in homely environments – equally 
deserve attention when planning and constructing, as well as maintaining and 
reorganizing the urban environment, if we intend to enhance the social and 
cultural, as well as the ecological and economic sustainability of our urban 
form of life in the long term. 
Now the crucial question is whether it is possible to foster an 
environmental relationship primarily based on atmospheric awareness or not. 
If one assumes an affirmative response to this question, one is tempted to ask 
further: how, exactly, is this done? In particular, what forms of environmental 
management and development – including both strategic and operative levels 
of planning, as well as the diverse processes of construction – could possibly 
be sensitive enough to preserve or even enhance the experiential quality of an 
urban environment that is subject to changes? These are even more critical 
issues if one properly acknowledges the essence of cities as constantly and 
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continuously evolving and ever-renewing entities. Hence it is not the change 
in itself but the nature of this change that may pose a threat to the often so 
delicate and humble aesthetics of everyday urban places. 
In order to tackle the aesthetic challenges related to change in people’s 
urban habitat, a few concluding remarks are in place. First of all, it should be 
properly recognized that different people really do experience various 
environments in different ways. This does not mean that everyone might 
perceive and interpret their surroundings in radically different or completely 
idiosyncratic ways, but that people actually do pay attention to different 
environmental aspects and details, and that they evaluate these aspects and 
details differently. Familiarity with certain types of environments plays a 
crucial role in this: it really does make a difference whether one has spent most 
of one’s life in urban, semi-urban or rural environments. Matters of 
homogeneity and diversity, cleanliness and shabbiness, as well as the presence 
of history in an environment, are all important.  
For example, if one is used to the excessive rationality and the central role 
played by public authorities that are visibly present in Nordic cities, the 
liveliness and a certain lack of order that is characteristic of many 
Mediterranean cities might appear odd, challenging and even oppressive. On 
the other hand, from the Mediterranean point of view, the neat, orderly and 
relatively young Nordic cities might indeed seem cold, unwelcoming and 
downright depressing. This is, however, a somewhat unsophisticated example, 
and more subtle differences exist within the Nordic and Mediterranean 
people, to be sure. 
In a study conducted in the Netherlands (Jansen 2014), significant 
differences were found in the way two reference groups valued their habitat 
and its prominent features. The two groups do not differ with regard to age, 
gender and income, but they do exemplify different stances concerning 
housing-related values: one group prefers safety, harmony and stability, 
whereas the other finds choosing, creating and exploring more important. 
According to the study, the former group prefers to “live in a dwelling with a 
traditional architectural design,” and in a relatively homogeneous 
neighborhood, since it provides them with “a sense of harmony and stability”
(Jansen 2014, p. 271–272). The latter group, in turn, prefers “an innovative 
architectural style” and “a neighbourhood with different types of residents and 
a mix of residential and commercial land uses” (Jansen 2014, p. 271–272).  
What is interesting here from our current point of view, is that the members 
of the latter group “less frequently prefer a newly built dwelling and less 
frequently would accept a dwelling in a new housing development,”
presumably because such forms of housing are regarded as “dull, monotonous 
and [having a] boring uniformity” (Jansen 2014, p. 272). There thus are clear 
differences between the groups in how they reacted to the more abstract 
experiential aspects of environments, and in the aesthetic evaluation of them. 
This example underlines that it really does matter how well the environment 
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corresponds to the overall values and “lifestyles” of urban dwellers.19 The 
differences in the lifestyles refer here particularly to matters of education level, 
family size and employment – that is, to factors that to a significant extent 
define the content of one’s everyday. In other words, an environment with the 
concrete functional affordances that suit one’s daily needs and desires is 
generally valued experientially and aesthetically; these experiential and 
aesthetic values, in turn, form another level of more abstract atmospheric 
environmental affordances that add to the overall value of that particular 
environment. 
These considerations provide a connection to my second remark, focusing 
on the role of expertize and education in environmental experience. It is 
widely recognized, and also empirically verified (see e.g. Gifford et al. 2000, 
2002), that environmental planning and construction experts (that is, 
architects and other designers) see the realities and potentialities of an 
environment in a different manner to the average end-user of that 
environment (that is, a resident, a regular visitor, or a passer-by). Gaining 
abstract knowledge regarding the functionalities and the technicalities behind 
the immediate appearance of an environment thus significantly alters one’s 
relation to the environment, also at the level of interpretative experience. This 
is an understandable outcome, particularly from the viewpoint of affordances 
and the notion of “skilled agent”: in order to become a full-blown member of 
the “community of environmental experts,” one simply has to learn to perceive 
and evaluate the realities and potentialities of an environment correctly – that 
is, according to the commonly shared principles and conceptions prevailing in 
that community. 
Such an outcome might, however, become a problem if the perspective of 
the experts and the “lay people” begin to diverge and differentiate too much. 
This can be seen as the stumbling block of modern architecture that relied 
heavily on the notion of “function”: while acknowledging merely those 
functions that were considered necessary and proper by the designer, modern 
thinking essentially dismisses the diversity of functions that the environments 
may de facto serve. Highlighting the “chosen” functions in architectural 
design, in turn, created a corresponding modernist aesthetic, resulting in 
                                                 
19 It is noteworthy that a similar study conducted in Finland (Ilmonen et al. 2000) provided comparable 
findings: when inquired about the most valuable features of their current area of residency, it was found 
out that the representatives of specific “know-how professions” (professions related to design, 
advertising and marketing) mentioned the character of the area more than twice as often as the 
representatives of specific “knowledge-based professions” (professions related to IT and natural 
sciences). Here the character-related responses consisted of descriptions of the area, its milieu, age or 
general reputation. In particular, the atmosphere, the design, the coherence and the idiosyncracy of the 
area were appreciated by the know-how professionals. Thus it seems that there is a correspondence 




ascetic and very streamlined environments, which seem to divide opinion 
particularly effectively (Gifford et al. 2000, 2002). 
Despite evident and sincere attempts to get rid of the elitism inherent in 
modern functionalism, the legacy of architectural modernism is to some extent 
present also in contemporary practices of planning and construction. In 
particular, there still seem to be considerable challenges in communicating the 
views and needs of the end-users to those who are in charge of the 
environmental design. For instance, Raine Mäntysalo et al. (2019, p. 23, 
emphasis added) have expressed their concerns about prevailing established 
practices: 
It is interesting – and alarming – that architects do not seem to take 
much interest in how their implemented designs are inhabited by their 
users. They communicate with each other through pictures in journals 
– and through architectural competitions – but knowledge about how 
the built architecture is used is unusual. 
One way of overcoming the evident gap between experts and end-users is 
to explore and evaluate the concrete outcomes of the design – that is, the 
buildings, neighborhoods, or larger areas of an environment – jointly and 
perhaps some time (say, some years) after the construction work has finished. 
Only then is one able to see how the environment actually serves the needs and 
desires of the residents, and what kind of context for the everyday actitivies it 
really provides. Such evaluative enterprises comprise a form of Post-
Occupancy Evaluation (POE), which can be broadly defined as “an appraisal 
of the degree to which a designed setting satisfies and supports explicit and 
implicitly [sic] human needs and values of those for whom a building is 
designed” (Friedmann et al. 1978; cited in Luusua 2016, p. 35). 
Despite an apparent demand for different forms of POE – focusing either 
on a single building, a neighborhood, or some other part of the urban 
environment – there are very few examples of examining the outcomes of 
planning and design processes from a retrospective perspective, at least in 
Finland. One evident reason for this is a lack of resources, but there may well 
be other – that is, social and cultural – factors involved. Perhaps the designers 
and planners are simply not too keen on receiving criticism of their work, at 
least if the criticism is presented in a very passionate and unmoderated way. 
However, POE need not focus solely on criticism and negative issues, and it is 
very important to try to find such concrete solutions that have proven to be 
successful – judging both from the viewpoints of the expert and the end-user. 
Luckily, there are at least some examples (see e.g. Kyttä et al. 2004) of such 
evaluations, too. 
Generally speaking, the most significant reason for the small number of 
POEs conducted in Finland is most probably structural in nature, having to do 
with legislation and the established practices of urban and land use planning. 
Namely, the land use planning system in Finland is such that it very much 
emphasizes utilizing research and various forms of reporting so that the effects 
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of a plan are adequately evaluated a priori – that is, before any concrete steps 
in altering the environment are taken (Luusua 2016). This, however, 
highlights the role of experts and related “hermeneutics and professional 
intuition” (Luusua 2016, p. 36, emphasis added) as the necessary basis for the 
evaluation, which might eventually be harmful from the perspective of 
enhancing communication between experts and end-users. 
There are a few reasons why an excessive emphasis on “professional 
intuition” might be detrimental, particularly with regard to experiential and 
aesthetic issues. First, it is not justifiable or sensible to assume that the 
perspective of environmental experts would be enough as such, since while 
obtaining formal education, the experts de facto modify the way they 
experience and evaluate the environment. They thus eventually gain a 
membership in a specific community of experience, whether they are aware of 
this or not.20  
In addition to this, end-users themselves can be members of specific 
communities of experience, due to their habitual and bodily everyday relations 
to certain environments. Such experiential communities based on a (partially) 
shared everyday in a (partially) shared environment tend to be very loose, and 
people might not even recognize the existence of such communities until its 
ultimate basis – that is, the shared socio-material context for living – is subject 
to major changes or otherwise under threat. The evident problem here is that 
the experts cannot gain membership of such local experiential communities 
that easily, even if they wanted to. All in all, the apparent differences in 
experience call for more effective means of taking the views of the potential 
end-users into account than those based on mere “professional intuition.” 
Examining in more detail the local affordances, both functional and 
atmospheric, that are crucial for the formation of experiential communities 
could provide a promising way forward here. 
The second reason for encountering problems if focusing too much on 
“professional intuitions” has to do with common language, or the lack of such 
language, between environmental experts and end-users. Put briefly, if people 
are not asked regularly enough, they may not learn to conceptualize their views 
and opinions about the quality of the urban environment clearly and 
informatively enough. In other words, people might have an experience that 
“something is not right” in their habitat, but they might find it difficult to 
articulate and communicate their experience – even if asked occasionally. 
Consider, for example, the following extract from an interview-based research 
study that examined the experiences of the residents in a newly built 
neighborhood (Mäenpää 2007, p. 174, emphasis added, translation altered): 
                                                 
20 It is clear that there does not exist any single community of experience that would cover all 
environmental experts, and, in reality, the experts represent a variety of different views regarding 




People felt that the area was peaceful, too quiet even. [However,] the 
interviewees had little to say about the physical streetscape, and nothing 
very drastic. [...] The architecture of the buildings, the structure of the 
residential blocks and the townscape generally remained something of 
a grey area in the interviews and were not discussed much. [...] The 
large-scale structure of the residential blocks and the massive urban 
proportions of the buildings were taken as a given and never discussed. 
On the basis of this particular research, it seems that people are more or 
less “resigned” to the prevailing realities of urban planning: they are not 
particularly willing or able to question or criticize the status quo, even if they 
have (justified) intuitions that some aspects of the environment are not 
optimal. However, if the typical large-scale structure and the massive 
proportions of newly built urban surroundings are more generally “taken as a 
given” – even though such environments would not afford interesting and 
versatile streetscapes, or lively and cozy public spaces that foster a vibrant 
urban life – it seems that there are severe shortcomings in providing people 
with real alternatives, and in publicly discussing the positive and negative 
aspects of alternative urban environments.  
It is due to the triumph of industrial housing production that the number 
of available real alternatives is very limited, so that there are scarce variables 
in the end-products on which the user may actually have effect. This is 
particularly the case with regard to individual apartment houses, but the same 
applies largely to commercial buildings, and to the construction of the urban 
environment in general. The continuing lack of alternatives has resulted in a 
situation in which many people are no longer able even to imagine more 
satisfying and diverse urban environments as their habitat, let alone to 
demand the realization of such environments. Hence, as Karin Krokfors (2016, 
p. 213, emphasis added) writes, we simply need more “examples that define 
what could be possible [;] in the lack of diversity in the housing stock, it is 
difficult for people to conceive what is possible, as the examples of doing things 
differently are yet so few.” 
Such a situation clearly is not merely the result of relying too much on 
“professional intuition,” but it has to do with the established construction 
process as a whole (see Krokfors 2016). The environmental experts do, 
however, have a special role as mediators between end-users and the usually 
rather conservative housing industry that operates according the logic of 
finances: they are the ones who compile the blueprints and the visualizations 
on the basis of various boundary conditions “given from above.” Despite the 
undeniably narrow and limited space that the building planners and urban 
environment planners generally have, they still ought to have the courage to 
use their “professional intuition” not only in accordance with the visions and 
the interests of the industry, but in order to provide people with real 
alternatives to choose from. The experts thus have the exceptional possibility 
of showing people what kind of (functional and experiential) affordances our 
habitat can offer us, but finding and creating the most essential affordances is 
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a task that demands a certain humility from the experts, for they do not plan 
the environment primarily for themselves. 
The kind of “silent approval” or a downright “hopelessness” implied from 
people’s side due to the current lack of alternatives comprises a very 
detrimental phenomenon from the perspective of enhancing urban 
sustainability. The lack of alternatives is both an outcome and a prerequisite 
for the homogenization of urban surroundings, which is in the focus of my 
third and final remark. By homogenization here I mean the process of cities 
and different parts of cities becoming more and more similar functionally and 
experientially, so that it is ever harder to figure out one’s whereabouts on the 
basis of an immediate experience.  
The homogenization of urban environments has its basis in the fact that 
newly built commercial and apartment buildings tend to be very similar –
mostly due to their industrial origin, as was seen above. Indeed, contemporary 
buildings are by and large compiled using pre-fabricated parts, and the largely 
automatized production processes of these parts define many of their qualities 
in advance. In the light of this, homogenization results from the 
standardization of the production processes, in the name of general efficiency 
and particularly cost-effectiveness. In short, standardization is simply a means 
to produce large amounts of commodities as economically as possible, and this 
inevitably implies that the outcomes have to be very homogeneous.  
To be fair, there is nothing wrong in standardization as such, as it can bring 
about indisputable economic benefits considering mass-produced 
commodities. Now the crucial question is, what is the adequate scope of 
standard-based thinking, and to which entities and aspects can we apply the 
logic of standardization? To be more exact, the crucial question is related to 
our possibility of choice: which entities and aspects of an urban environment 
do we wish to be standardized, and which entities and aspects do we wish to 
keep outside the scope of standardization? 
It is clear that not only the production of pre-fabricated parts is 
standardized, but that entire buildings can also be, and indeed are, constructed 
in standardized ways. The mass-production of residential and commercial 
buildings practically defines the present-day realities of construction, and 
projects that utilize any custom-made solutions are relatively unusual, 
instantiating the exceptional importance of the project.21 Indeed, any 
significant differences between newly produced buildings are rare – even with 
regard to their composition and appearance, though these aspects typically are 
                                                 
21 The case with renovation construction is somewhat different, since the structures and other 
architectural features of the existing building largely define the possibilities and the restrictions of the 
project, so that the proposed solutions necessarily are context-sensitive and thus more or less custom-
made. Despite this, the methods and the means of a renovation project are, to a significant degree, 
standardized, so that the difference between “ordinary” and renovation construction projects is not 




not as pre-determined by various regulations as the more technical issues 
might be. 
The ultimate result of the large-scale standardization of individual 
buildings is that the urban environment in its entirety becomes more and more 
homogeneous. This has been going on ever since the beginning of 
industrialized housing production. The industrial production was introduced 
at the level of theory by the pioneer architectural modernists in the 1920s, and 
at the level of practice by profit-seeking construction companies in the 1960s 
(see Krokfors 2016). 
Homogenization is a type of change that is particularly dangerous from the 
viewpoint of the experiential quality of the environment, as it eradicates the 
distinctive features of the urban environments that have evolved in the course 
of decades or even centuries. The evident problem here is that homogenization 
is not a well-defined planning problem that might be exposed when 
undertaking an objective statistical analysis of an urban environment: 
evaluating an environment only in the light of various technical and economic 
factors does not reveal a worrying situation regarding its experiential and 
aesthetic dimensions. 
These challenges have been widely recognized in the past decades, and the 
reaction against such homogenization comprises a significant part of the 
criticism of architectural modernism. Such criticism has typically been 
formulated as a defense of places, and it is clear that places are in the centre of 
the debate around homogenization. According to the central argument, 
existing urban places provide the basis for urban diversity, and if they are 
transformed into standard-like environments without any real distinctive 
characteristics, the related urban diversity may be lost forever.  
Related to this, we can identify two different yet interconnected lines of 
development that by and large define the conditions of contemporary 
urbanism and its relation to places.22 First, cities are adopting entirely new 
strategies for growth: they generally aim at growing inwards by increasing the 
density of the urban structure and utilizing various forms of urban infill. This 
is a radical change, particularly in Finland, that has largely relied on a 
distinctively loose urban structure that can be extended to nearby forests and 
farmlands if needed. For instance, a few years ago in Helsinki, the capital of 
Finland, the Vision for the new City Plan stated that “sufficient housing 
production requires significant construction volumes and extensive area 
reservations, [implying that] we cannot only build on the outskirts of the 
current areas” (City of Helsinki 2013, p. 29, emphasis added). According to the 
Vision, such a situation changes the nature of urban planning and thus calls 
for an entirely “new way of perceiving the city” (City of Helsinki 2013, p. 29). 
                                                 
22 These considerations are based on observations particularly from Finland, but they are applicable to 




The apparent need for new strategies for growth comes from sustainability-
related arguments. The main idea is that a more dense urban structure enables 
more efficient public transportation, moderate distances in the urbanite’s 
everyday, and accessible public and commercial services (see e.g. City of 
Helsinki 2013). These are the indisputable advantages of more dense cities, 
but it is not entirely clear whether the effects on urban sustainability have been 
addressed comprehensively enough.  
In a more dense urban structure, the demand for moving around on a daily 
basis would obviously decrease, so that the related energy consumption and 
greenhouse emissions would also decrease accordingly. In addition to this, 
systematic densification is, however, likely to alter the quality of nearby 
surroundings significantly for masses of urban dwellers. Increasing density 
through infill development is by necessity an intervention that more or less 
alters the context of living for local residents. Such an intervention may either 
improve or weaken the quality of the local environment, and the ultimate 
outcome depends on the concrete execution of the infill project (see 
Vihanninjoki 2018). 
From the viewpoint of experiential quality, the worst case scenario is that 
typical infill projects extend the standardization and homogenization of urban 
environments to a number of previously “untouched” urban areas. It is true 
that urban environments are, in principle, subject to change all the time: urban 
environments are the result of lengthy and complex processes, and we can see 
merely a single “still frame” of these processes at one time. Having said this, it 
is reasonable to presume that the mentioned “new way of perceiving the city”
may have considerable effects on the situation – most probably accelerating 
the pace of change, at least to some degree. 
Thinking of everyday urban places, it is necessary to recognize the 
challenges that large-scale urban infill can pose to experiential quality in both 
the near and the distant future. In short, if numerous infill projects are not 
planned and executed carefully and sensitively enough, there is a significant 
risk that the existing places become more and more similar in the course of 
time.23 This, in turn, can remarkably reduce urban diversity and thus 
                                                 
23 These kinds of challenges have been taken into consideration in Helsinki, or at least there seem to be 
intentions pointing in this direction. Consider the following caption from the Vision (City of Helsinki 
2013, p. 30): “Supplementary construction will be supported on all levels. In some areas, the increase in 
construction rights may be significant, which, in itself, will change the nature of these areas substantially. 
[...]  However, the building heritage and identity of areas must be taken into account when performing 
supplementary construction. Supplementary construction must be of high quality. It must improve the 
image of current areas.” It is not, however, entirely clear how these ambitious and noble objectives will 
be achieved. For example, the City Planning Department has developed a “sensitivity analysis” that 
examines how well the different areas of the city are likely to cope with change caused by urban infill 
(City of Helsinki 2014). The apparent problem with this method is that it is applied merely to a set of 
relatively coherently constructed areas, and not to any temporally layered or mixed areas. In addition, 
the method is not meant to be used in urban areas built after the 1980s at all. On this basis it seems that 
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compromise the resilience and the related sustainability of urbanized society 
as a whole.24 In this sense, while an excessive standardization of the urban 
environment might appear cost-efficient in the short run, and bring about 
short-term benefits and profits, in the long run it can cause unanticipated and 
very far-reaching expenses, both financial and socio-cultural in nature. 
Compared to the general tendency of cities growing inwards by increasing 
the density of their urban structure, the second line of development is related 
to places even more straightforwardly, having specifically to do with the role 
that places have in contemporary urban development. Today, the significance 
of lively and prosperous places is often explicitly stated and even emphasized, 
and the various forms of place-making comprise a considerable part of 
present-day urban design. Despite this, it is not always clear what kinds of 
places are regarded as “proper meaningful places,” and exactly what kind of 
                                                 
the presented method serves primarily governmental purposes related to preserving cultural history, 
and that it is fairly useless in safeguarding the experiential quality of various everyday environments and 
their places. 
24 Urban diversity, resilience and sustainability are all essentially interconnected. “Resilience” is a 
central term in contemporary sustainability sciences, making eventually sense of what sustainability is 
and what is required of sustainable systems. In short, according to a classic definition “resilience is the 
capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain 
essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks” (Walker et al. 2004). On this basis, 
“from a resilience perspective, sustainability is not about maintaining a system at its equilibrium state 
[...] but rather sustainability should focus on the system’s capacity to create and test opportunities and 
maintain adaptive capabilities” (Wu & Wu 2013, p. 219; see also Holling 2001). From the viewpoint of 
urbanism, the resiliency-based interpretation of sustainability means a shift from “stability, optimality 
and predictability” to a perspective focusing on “risk management” and “avoiding potentially 
catastrophic regime shifts” (Wu & Wu 2013, p. 219). Maintaining urban diversity, in turn, is an important 
means of managing risks by decentralizing them: when encountering an unpredictable change at the 
societal level, not all parts of the urban structure rely on exactly the same prerequisites in order to remain 
functioning. Hence the diversity within an urban system ultimately contributes to the performance of 
the urbanized society as a whole in the case of an unpredictable event. The Covid-19 pandemic is an 
illustrative example of such an unpredictable event that poses a significant threat to the contemporary 
urban life form. In a relatively short time, the pandemic had caused a state of emergency due to which 
the normal functioning of urbanized societies by and large ceased. All around the world urban everyday 
was suddenly and radically redefined (see e.g. Lehtinen 2020), as people were either instructed or 
obliged to remain home and to avoid unnecessary movement – spending time in public places and using 
public transport was to be avoided. In such a situation the “densifying public transportation city” (City 
of Helsinki 2013, p. 12) was not that sustainable anymore, as people were mainly trying to cope in their 
relatively tightly-fitted urban dwellings, and were not able to use the public urban space as their living-
room anymore. All in all, this is not to say that enabling efficient public transport would not be an 
important objective sustainability-wise, but that it also is absolutely necessary to take care of the 
diversity of urban surroundings, so that future unpredictable events do not paralyze the urbanized 
societies so widely. 
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relation to places and their development is desirable from the viewpoint of 
municipal authorities and commercial actors. 
For instance, there are a few differing views concerning the nature of place-
making – that is, concerning what is, or ought to be, called place-making.25 
Generally, two different stances exist: the first one states that place-making is 
a “top-down,” design-driven, government and planning-oriented enterprise; 
the second states that place-making consists of “bottom-up,” community-
driven and self-organizing grassroots-level activities. These two conceptions, 
in a way, manifest the ideal types of place-making, and in real life the place-
making projects and their related activities are often some kind of hybrid, 
mixing the characteristic features of these opposing ends. 
For our current purposes, what is most important in these 
characterizations of place-making is that both are based on a specific kind of 
relation to places: they both seem to presume that places are primarily “made”
on a conscious and intentional basis, and that place-making really comprises 
a specific activity of its own. This is, however, only partly true, and reveals our 
limited understanding of the relation we have to our places in our everyday. 
Consider, for example, the following quotation from a recent dissertation by 
Jani Tartia (2019, p. 121–122, emphasis altered): 
[M]uch of the place-making processes of the city are not the regulated 
or conscious attempts to create a (shared) sense of place but something 
that happens idiomatically through spatial uses. [...] If we only pay 
attention – whether research, design or policy-wise – to the sites 
deemed as (traditional, fixed, bounded) places, we can only reach a part 
of what the city is. [...] The day-to-day habitual routes and the 
intersections and street-corner spaces experienced in passing require 
the same kind of interest, analytical focus and appreciation as the other 
spaces of the city. We need to consider more seriously the role of 
temporality and the day-to-day ‘non-special’ spaces – that are often 
experienced, used and performed in motion. 
The argument here is that many of the meaningful places in our urban 
everyday were actually never “made” in the sense of narrowly defined place-
making: they simply are not the outcome of conscious and intentional 
attempts to give the urban environment “a meaning.” They are meaningful 
precisely because of their role as “enablers” in our everyday, and their 
meaningfulness is brought about through the idiomatic uses that give shape to 
our daily life. Such places tend to be “non-special” in that their meaning can 
be fully understood merely from within the temporal course of our everyday 
                                                 
25 In Finland, “place-making” is not a very established concept, and it even has no direct translation. 
Despite this, various forms of place-making are very much present in contemporary Finnish urban 
planning practices and policies; this can be seen most easily in the notable emphasis on the sense of place 
(“sense of place must be taken into account,” “sense of place must be fostered” etc.). 
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activities, which is why they might remain negligible or even invisible to an 
outsider. 
These considerations give reason to rethink the role that the “established”
forms of place-making – either top-down, or bottom-up – have in improving 
and maintaining the experiential quality of our everyday environments. Such 
forms of place-making are, without doubt, important in that they often give us 
very beneficial and useful tools for creating new urban places or radically 
updating an existing place. Acknowledging this, these kinds of place-based 
projects are not the only means to take care of the experiential quality of our 
urban surroundings. And, to be honest, they may not necessarily comprise the 
most suitable instruments for managing our existing everyday environments 
and their places. 
Hence, in order to emphasize and appropriately honor the significance of 
various everyday places and their humble yet sensitive experiential qualities 
and characteristics, we need to encourage a form of place-maintaining either 
instead of, or in addition to, the different branches of place-making. Only if we 
manage to nurture effectively the precious diversity that includes peculiar, 
banal, and sometimes rough or even grotesque everyday urban places, will we 




SUMMARIES OF THE ORIGINAL 
PUBLICATIONS 
Article I serves as a general introduction to Heideggerian place-based ontology 
as applied to the contemporary condition. The article consists of a dialogue 
with Relphian human geography, which essentially relies on the Heideggerian 
notion of “place” but falls short of providing a thorough account of the 
placedness of human existence. The article thus includes a shift of focus from 
the consciousness-based model of intentionality to analyzing the role that the 
existential, materially-based intentionalities have in the constitution of human 
experience and existence. Accordingly, there is an ontological difference 
between places as ontic phenomena and places as ontological structures, 
referring to the difference between places encountered within the lifeworld 
and places as constitutive of the lifeworld. As ontological structures, places 
cannot in principle be encountered and thus thematized as objects of 
conscious experience; this is a feature that the Relphian contextual 
interpretation of place fails to recognize clearly enough. The article also 
provides a critique of contemporary design-led place-making policies and 
practices that overly rely on an object-based interpretation of places, 
eventually regarding meaningful and authentic urban places as deliberately 
created design-artifacts. 
Article II introduces the fundamentals of the postphenomenological 
philosophy of technology, particularly the idea of mediation as a basis for the 
technologically conditioned relations between humans and their world. The 
article complements the postphenomenological stance by addressing in more 
detail the experiential qualities of our relationship to different kinds of 
technologies, namely to proper machines and other tools. The article also 
includes an application of the theory of affordances, which originates in 
ecological environmental psychology but which has been further developed in 
order to cover various fields of study. The concept of “canonical affordance” is 
also introduced, as well as its potential for understanding the constitution of 
our everyday experience of useful things and environments. The salient 
connections between postphenomenology and affordance-based thinking are 
pointed out: both frameworks emphasize the intertwining of tool-based 
practices and perception, implying that when we learn to use various tools and 
devices, we eventually learn to perceive the world in terms of them. Despite 
the common interest in the constitution of perception, both frameworks 
struggle with getting a proper hold of the matters related to the quality of 
perception, which essentially falls within scope of aesthetics. The article 
tackles these issues by means of a case study, examining the experiential and 
aesthetic repercussions of contemporary portable wayfinding devices.  
Article III continues developing the themes presented in article I, applying 
the notion of “affordance” in elaborating the Heideggerian perspective on the 
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problem of designing authentic places. The main argument goes that 
contemporary place-making essentially contributes to the homogenization of 
urban environments and the places they consist of, thus remaining under the 
influence of the universalist modern project, despite an explicit focus on the 
particularity and authenticity of the created places. This is due to the largely 
applied marketing strategies that reduce the diversity of urban places to a pre-
defined and pre-fabricated selection of “place brands,” so that the alleged 
differences between places remain marginal and are more or less invented 
from the very beginning. Accordingly, there is a shift from the standards of 
“modern man” to those of a “mobile consumer,” and while the modernist view 
represents certain “aesthetics of standardization,” contemporary place-
making is a manifestation of “standardized aesthetics.” The affordance-based 
account of places and their experiential character is helpful in understanding 
the speculativeness of the place-making project that operates at the level of 
“generalized subject” and “generalized place experiences,” thus ignoring the 
necessary idiosyncrasies inherent in every possible experiencing agent. Such 
presumptions are harmful in that they falsely give rise to the possibility of 
regarding the created places as “experience machines,” supposedly producing 
pre-defined and ultimately controlled types of urban experience. 
In article IV, the themes presented in article II are further elaborated, 
particularly from the viewpoint of mobility and movement in urban 
surroundings. The case studies are an aid to understanding the role of 
movement-related technologies in the formation of (both modern and 
contemporary) urban experience. The examples show that technologies 
effectively open up new possibilities of using and experiencing urban 
environments while simultaneously reducing the significance of some existing 
possibilities. From the viewpoint of places this means that even though 
technologies notably alter and redefine the ways in which we interact with our 
immediate environs, such changes can be seen as a continuous reorganization 
of our relationships to the various places in the urban make-up. Accordingly, 
new places and their affordances may become more accessible to us, and we 
may also learn to perceive new affordances in previously known and familiar 
places. Despite this, the mediating role of places in our relationship to our 
environment, and to our world, remains unaltered, even though technologies 
also have a considerable bearing in this process of mediation. The applied 
frameworks of postphenomenology and affordance-theory emphasize the 
materiality underlying the more abstract experiences of urban environments 
and urbanity in general. The case studies effectively point out that the 
constantly evolving varieties of urban experience – such as the metaphoric 
experiences of the “city as a machine,” of the “urban sublime,” and of the “city 
as a complex systemic whole” – cannot be grasped thoroughly without paying 
adequate attention to the material and technological basis they are founded 
upon. 
Article V applies postphenomenological thinking and the theory of 
affordances in analyzing the aesthetic character or sense of contemporary 
 
61 
urban places in more detail. The article summarizes the main ideas and 
arguments presented in previous articles, putting forward a 
postphenomenologically-oriented affordance-based framework for 
understanding the aesthetics of everyday urban places. The affordance theory 
has salient connections to evolutionary environmental psychology: according 
to the evolutionary argument, environmental aesthetic preferences and the 
perceived quality of an environment presumably inform us about the 
affordances of that environment in a very straightforward and cost-efficient 
way. This observation is not supposed to serve as an exhaustive account of the 
aesthetic dimensions of an environment, but it helps us in understanding the 
general role that aesthetics and quality-related issues have in the constitution 
of our everyday experiences of mundane environments and their places. Place-
based canonical affordances are of crucial importance concerning our 
experience of those familiar places, even though such affordances are not 
usually the focus of our experience yet they manifest a specific experiential 
quality. Canonical affordances remain in the background of experience, and 
their presence comprises a form of “present absence” that has “atmospheric 
characteristics.” We are thus aware of them, though not in a fully conscious 
manner, for we perceive them peripherally – that is, directly but in a non-
focused way. On this basis, the article concludes with the idea that 
familiarization with places means that new, more nuanced place-based 
affordances become canonical to us, entailing qualitative changes in the 
perception of those affordances, thus also giving rise to notable repercussions 
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